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COPYRIGHT TREATMENT OF FREELANCE
WORK IN THE DIGITAL ERA
Giuseppina D'Agostinot
Without formal petition
Thus stands my condition:
I am closely blocked up in a garret,
Where I scribble and smoke,
And sadly invoke
The powerful assistance of claret...
-Thomas Brown, The Poet's Condition'
I. INTRODUCTION
More than three centuries ago, Thomas Brown, a graduate of
Oxford,2 wrote about the debt-ridden fate of London hack writers.
Patron-less, they wrote for money. As Philip Pinkus details in his
elaborate study of the colorful and skillful Grub Street 3 writers, "there
were arid moments when they could not squeeze a shilling from their
publisher or an ounce of credit from the tavern-keeper."4 Whilst their
works have been at times cast as mere "doggerel" as they were not the
Swifts or Popes of the era, the seventeenth century hacks revealingly
dispel the dire condition of the common writer. Writing in destitute
times, these writers deliberately chose subjects, which appealed to
their readers, from politics to thorny themes like marriage. And
although hacks like Thomas Brown led austere lives, they still dared
t Lecturer in Law and DPhil Candidate, St. Peter's College, University of Oxford;
Barrister & Solicitor, Law Society of Upper Canada; MStud in Legal Studies, St. Peter's
College, University of Oxford; LLB Osgoode Hall Law School; Hon BA York University. The
author is most grateful to David Freedman for his constant support and insight in bringing this
work to completion.
1. PHILIP PINKUS, GRUB ST. STRIPPED BARE: THE SCANDALOUS LIVES & PORNOGRAPHIC
WORKS OF THE ORIGINAL GRUB ST. WRITERS 160 (1968).
2. Id. Thomas Brown was 'the most renowned of the Grub Street hacks.' Born in 1663,
he was educated at Christ Church, Oxford.
3. Id. at xi. Grub Street refers to a particular time and place: London at the turn of the
seventeenth century. "But Grub Street is itself a metaphor, evoking the eternal spirit of the hack
writer," PINKUS, supra note 1, at xi.
4. Id. at 14.
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to dream and aspired for something better. Today, Thomas Brown is
the twenty-first century freelance writer. In part because they are not
the Rushdies or Kings of our times, freelancers illustrate the current
plight of the aspiring writer as they are subject to similarly
unfavorable economic, social, and legal conditions.
This Article examines the current legal state of freelancers as
they attempt to earn a living through their writing. To do so, I will
begin to explore the angst of freelancers throughout the history of the
western world in relation to copyright law. I argue that copyright law,
which was purported to address the needs of the author through
protection of works and thus create incentives to produce and bolster
societal well-being, has insufficiently met these objectives. In
practice, freelancers have typically become at the behest of
publishers-the real right holders-receiving a disproportionate
benefit.
The current proliferation of digital technologies expands the
publisher's exploitation powers. Increasingly, publishers exploit
freelancers' works not only in print form but also digitally, often by
making them available through their own Web sites or by selling
them to third party databases. Freelancers argue that they receive no
notice, give no consent, and obtain no payment for the exploitation of
their works through these new digital uses. In justification,
publishing conglomerates seize on ambiguous contracts5 previously
made with their freelancers to read in allowable new uses. The
central issue is whether the authors' contracts, by which copyright is
transferred for publishers to print their works, contemplate electronic
publication rights. For staff writers, it is a moot point, 6 but for
freelancers who base their livelihoods on each new contract, the issue
is a vital one. This is not solely an issue of contract law. While
contract doctrines may be material, the question of freelancers'
transfer rights necessarily implicates copyright law. Copyright law
therefore requires a management system that is attuned to such
intangible goods. This issue similarly concerns copyright law and its
5. Many such contracts are oral or 'handshake' contracts as per the publishing industry
custom, but there is evidence that this is changing; Bernie Corbett, Freelance Briefing Paper,
THE FREELANCE, July, 2000, at http://media.gn.apc.org/fl/0007grab.html (last visited Dec. 12,
2002) (detailing various British and American publishers which have sent legal letters to their
contributors asking for absolute rights to their works).
6. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address employed writers which in most
jurisdictions fall under the purview of separate legal doctrines; in the United Kingdom, the
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act provides that works produced during the course of one's
employment belong to the employer. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 11(2)
(Eng.) [hereinafter CDPA].
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future, since the development of new technologies will continue to
open up new markets of exploitation and with this, renewed
challenges to copyright law.7
Such phenomena cannot be viewed as a temporary reflection of
market forces, and that with time new industry customs will develop
to resolve the current uncertainty in copyright conveyancing of new
uses. 8 Should such a laissez-faire approach be adopted, publishers
who are in a better position of power will continue to extol a
disproportionate benefit from their freelancers. More and more,
publishing is not so much a "public trust" but part of a multi-million
dollar industry wherein multimedia conglomerates vie for a greater
share of the online market.9 This problem is indeed reflective of a
relationship of historical imbalance now exacerbated through these
new uses.
While arguably publishers who have benefited from these new
uses did not-at the onset of electronic publishing-appreciate the
extent of their rights, it is unfathomable that publishers are presently
informed of their rights and yet continue to charge forth with their
digital publishing agenda or, conversely, terminate contracts to avoid
appropriate solutions with fair compensation schemes. Indeed, while
copyright laws facilitate advantageous terms for publishers, they do
little for authors and, as will ultimately become apparent, little for
users of such works.' 0 This conduct is unfair and calls for a re-
evaluation of copyright law. While I do not believe that copyright
alone is the panacea for safeguarding freelancers' rights, I do contend
that together with other mechanisms (such as government and
industry forces), copyright can be an effective tool for social policy;
at the very least, we should want it to be.
In this Article, I plan to specifically study freelancers' rights vis-
A-vis publishing conglomerates that own daily newspapers or
magazines. Increasingly, freelancers have turned to the courts to
vindicate their rights. They allege that publishers are liable for
copyright infringement, and should duly compensate them for new
7. Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Don't Put my Article Online: Extending Copyright's New-
Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 900
(1995).
8. Copyright law has coped despite the past influx of new technologies from the creation
of Edison's phonograph (1877) to compact discs (1982). Anthony Murphy, Queen Anne and the
Anarchists: Can Copyright Survive the Digital Age?, Oxford Intellectual Property Research
Center Seminar Series 26 (Feb. 2002).
9. See generally ANDRE SCHIFFRIN, THE BUSINESS OF BOOKS (2000).
10. E.g., F. Willem Grosheide, Copyright Law from a User's Perspective: Access Rights
for Users, 23(7) E.I.P.R. 321, 321 (2001).
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uses of their works. This phenomenon can be seen around the
western world: Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, Germany,
France, Belgium, and Austria have all experienced such claims.
Interestingly, Britain has yet to litigate such a case. These mainly
favorable decisions have nonetheless proven unsettling to British
publishers. For instance, one of Britain's major publishing houses
made plans to have all of its freelancers give up copyright in all future
media when submitting articles for print.1 As a result, my objective
will be to look for guiding legal principles in these other jurisdictions
and advance proposals in order to help safeguard freelancers' rights in
Britain, and generally across the western world.
There is much to glean from the current case law. It has been
argued that the continental European cases are more supportive of
authors' rights as the laws stem from the droit d'auteur tradition, in
contrast to the American cases which enforce publishers' interests as
these are rooted in the common law tradition. 12  In part, it will be
interesting to see to what extent this commentary is borne out in my
analysis, especially when we consider Britain's "mixed" law
tradition.
3
My research confirms that a reasonable body of literature has
recently developed dealing with digital technologies and freelancers'
digital uses, most of which is American. Such commentators, who
have mainly studied one US decision,' 4 have predominantly neglected
to look beyond their domestic system. 15 In Canada and Europe, very
11. American Society of Journalists & Authors, Contracts Watch, at
http://www.asja.org/cw/cwfiles/cw951101.php (last visited Dec. 12, 2002) (on EMAP Business
Publishing, a leading British house of business and computer magazines and professional
journals). See Corbett, supra note 5 (for other current accounts of "rights grabs").
12. W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 377 (4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell London
1999).
13. The British tradition features a tension between the common law and civilian based
approaches to copyright wherein there is no difference between creators and investors in the
former, and authors' rights are distinctly celebrated in the latter; in Britain, the CDPA 1988
obliterated this division which previously would have made the British system more akin to the
civilian tradition. See id.
14. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 533 U.S. 483 (2001); see generally Michael Spink,
Authors Stripped of Their Electronic Rights in Tasini v. New York Times Co., 32 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 409 (1999); Laurie A. Santelli, New Battles Between Freelance Authors and Publishers
in the Aftermath of Tasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 253 (1999); and Yuri Hur, Tasini
v New York Times: Ownership of Electronic Copyrights Rightfully Returned to Authors, 21 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65 (2000). While these works are somewhat dated since the decision, the
principles of such works are nonetheless relevant and will be duly considered.
15. Irene S. Ayers, International Copyright Law & the Electronic Media Rights of
Authors & Publishers, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 29, 63 (1999) (examining freelancers'
case law in various countries but is not undertaking a historical or theoretical analysis).
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little legal commentary exists,16 and very few scholars have taken into
account the history and theory of publishing practices relating to
freelancers.17 More importantly, there is an insignificant amount of
literature that analyses the British system and its treatment of
freelancers in the digital era.18 My aim is to fill this gap. At the same
time, I also recognize that there is a burgeoning body of commentary
that evaluates the efficacy of copyright to cope with the blitz of
digitization. At least two scholarly camps have evolved which align
themselves with either the "copyright is dead"' 9 or "copyright can
cope '2° ethos. I wish to be part of neither. I offer that copyright law
can and should cope. The important proviso is that it should by no
means do so alone: government, industry players, authors' and
publishers' groups, and collective societies must cooperate in
reconfiguring the copyright system.
This Article is divided into eight sections. Section II explores
freelancers' current state of imbalance vis-A-vis their publishers in the
digital milieu alongside copyright policy objectives. Section III
analyses copyright's historical underpinnings, illustrating that while
copyright law was purported to protect the author, it was established
for, and has been primarily exploited by, publishers. The remaining
sections (IV-VII) concern freelancers' legislative and judicial
copyright treatment from both a national and international
perspective. Since Britain has yet to decide a case on point, section
VII examines other copyright sectors, such as the film industry,
relating to conveyancing of copyright, to provide some insight in the
judicial interpretation of new uses. Finally, section VIII advances
preliminary proposals for re-crafting the copyright treatment of
16. Much of the commentary is by way of newspaper articles and publishing industry
periodicals, which I draw upon. The issue has yet to be explored in the legal academic
community. Some case commentary exists in Europe; see P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Annmeique
de Kroon, The Electronic Rights War, Institute for Information Law-University of Amsterdam
(2000), at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/e-rights.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2002).
17. Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution &
Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 473 (2000) (considering the issue from a theoretical
perspective only).
18. Tim Naprawa, Secondary Use of Articles in Online Databases Under UK Law, 9
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 331 (1996) (providing an overview of applicable British law with very little
commentary).
19. See generally John P. Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of the
Mind on the Global Net, Electronic Frontier Foundation, at
http://www.eff.org/IP/idea-economy.article (last visited Dec. 10, 2002); David Nimmer, The
End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385 (1995); and Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Author's
Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
20. See generally Douglas J. Masson, Fixation on Fixation: Why Imposing Old Copyright
Law on New Technology Will Not Work, 71 IND. L.J. 1049 (1996).
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freelancers in the digital world.
II. FREELANCERS AND COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ERA
A. Defining Copyright Law
Before we examine the freelancer's current condition vis-A-vis
her publisher, it is instructive to have a basic understanding of
copyright law. Copyright is a western invention. Copyright law falls
under the umbrella of "intellectual property law," and is consequently
distinct from real property.2' While real property protects tangible
objects, copyright law protects intangible property as the expression
of one's ideas.22  The key objective of copyright is to grant
exploitation rights to owners of original works. As defined in
Britain's Copyright, Designs & Patent Act (CDPA), 23 copyright
initially grants various enumerated exploitation rights to an "author"
who "creates" a work.24 The CDPA grants protection to a number of
categories of works. My focus is on original literary works. A
literary work is defined in the CDPA as a written work, other than
dramatic or musical, that may include computer programs or
compilations.2 5 Freelancers' articles are thus literary works whether
in print or digital form.
The concept of "originality" is important when recognizing
copyright protection.2 6 The test for a work's uniqueness "is a matter
21. DAVID VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 293 (1997).
22. Of course, for Lord Hailsham, it all depends on what is meant by an "idea." See L.B.
Plastics Ltd. v. Swish Prods. Ltd., RPC 551 (1979), where copyright in production drawings for
knock-down furniture drawers prevented one company from copying the commercial furniture
produced by a competitor. The idea/expression dichotomy may not be very useful if the concept
of idea is not fully understood.
23. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, ch. 48.
24. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, ch. 48 § 2(1), exploitation rights delineated further
in Section If. For comparative purposes in Canada's Copyright Act, copyright means the sole
right to reproduce, perform or publish a work and procure any profits therefrom. Copyright Act,
R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 3 (Can.).
25. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, ch. 48 § 3(1).
26. Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd., 2 Ch. 601, 609 (1916).
Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of ideas but with the expression of
thought .... The originality, which is required, relates to the expression of the thought. But the
Act does not require that the expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work
must not be copied from another work-that it should originate from the author.
Or "originality" is as Jessica Litman states, used for dividing "... privately-owned from the
commons and to draw lines among the various parcels of private ownership." Jessica Litman,
The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1000 (1990). This piece is not dedicated to
undertaking a detailed analysis of originality of copyright. Suffice it to say that there are various
views on the subject that elide clear definitions.
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of degree depending on the amount of skill, judgment, or labor
involved in its making. 27  Consequently, not only must creative
intellectual activity produce the right kind of work, but "the author's
input must satisfy a certain minimum standard of effort., 28  The
author is an individual who is solely responsible and exclusively
deserving of the credit for the creation of a unique work.29
It is argued that Britain has moved towards a "mixed system" of
copyright law. 30 Typically, the common law tradition, which admits
protection both of individuals and corporate bodies, stands in contrast
to the continental European tradition based on the individual
protection of the author. William Cornish notes that the once distinct
mechanism of protecting authors and neighboring rights, as done in
the civilian system, has been abolished with the adoption of the
CDPA.3' Moreover, unlike many other European countries, Britain
allows waiver of moral rights by contract or estoppel,32 as practiced in
Canada and the US. In these respects, Britain's system is more akin
to those of the common law tradition, and less to those of the civilian,
droit d'auteur systems in continental Europe.
B. Copyright Policy Objectives and the Publishing Industry
Copyright law purports to promote culture and the dissemination
of works, "by providing incentives to authors and artists to produce
worthy work and to entrepreneurs to invest in the financing,
production, and distribution of such work. ' '33  At the same time,
copyright law should balance the interests of copyright owners with
34those of users. Thus, copyright law seeks to promote an
equilaterally sided balance of interests between authors, publishers,
and users. 35  However, current societal developments, like the
establishment of entrepreneurial copyright, instill antagonism
between authors or users and those who exploit works. 36
27. WILLIAM CORNISH, supra note 12, at 382; Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed Co. Ltd.
v. Sleep-King Adjustable Bed Co. Ltd., 3 CPR (3d) 81 (1984).
28. CORNISH, supra note 12, at 382; Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v William Hill (Football)
Ltd. 1 All E.R. 465 (1964).
29. Martha Woodmansee, The Genius & the Copyright: Economic & Legal Conditions of
the Emergence of the "Author, " EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 425, 426 (1984).
30. CORNISH, supra note 12, at 377.
31. CORNISH, supra note 12.
32. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act ch. 48 § 87.
33. VAVER, supra note 21, at 22.
34. Grosheide, supra note 10.
35. VAVER, supra note 21.
36. Grosheide, supra note 10.
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Consequently, as Willem Grosheide argues, this phenomenon has led
to the demise of copyright's once idealistic "golden triangle" of
interests.
37
Authors face an ever-competitive capitalist market, wherein
publishers are owners vying for increased protection of their
copyrights. The concept of "author" and "owner" are more and more
mutually exclusive. Copyright is concerned primarily not with
"lonely starving artists" but with companies-ranging from small and
not-for-profit concerns to huge multi-million dollar contracts.38
Andr6 Schiffrin's recent book 39 is an informative critique of the book
publishing industry, and his comments are equally applicable to the
general print industry. Schiffrin provides a glimpse of past and recent
developments: the ever-growing greed of publishers that impacts and
drives author-publisher legal arrangements. He details how five
major conglomerates now control 80% of American book sales, while
independent storeowners enjoy a decreased share in the market from
about 17% to 15%.40 The same trend can be seen in the newspaper
industry.4' Such a change in the structure of publishing from the
small to large media conglomerates has affected the type of
contractual arrangements between publisher and author and, in turn,
the quality and diversity of publishing. Moreover, without the agents
representing them, authors are further disadvantaged.42 The agent is
equally guided by moneymaking and as a result, cannot represent all
authors,. especially the nameless freelancers. Only celebrity authors
such as Stephen King can maximize revenue for agents and
publishers. Yet, without the agents, and the industry supporting them,
authors derive little benefit from copyright law as they vainly attempt
to publish their works. In essence, contractual relationships and other
industry elements comprise a vital dimension to the management of
copyright law. Therefore copyright policy objectives cannot be seen
in a vacuum, but must necessarily contemplate publishing industry
dynamics that typically undermine authors.
37. Grosheide, supra note 10.
38. JOHN GURNSEY, COPYRIGHT THEFT 17 (1995).
39. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 9.
40. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 9, at 2.
41. See, e.g., The Guild Reporter, Taking the Fight for a Free Press to the Hill, THE
NEWSPAPER GUILD, ot http://www.newsguild.org/g/grdisplay.php?storylD=675 (last
visited Dec. 9, 2002).
42. In Canada, there are only about 20 agents. See THE WRITERS' UNION OF CANADA,
DEAR WRITER (1998).
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C. Freelancers and Digital Publishing
... writers are as interchangeable as and abundant and skilled
as plankton.43
1. The Freelancer
Often, freelance authors earn a living by selling specialized
articles. Obtaining work can be difficult due to the lack of available
freelance jobs, and the need for substantial self-promotion and
marketing." Without any support staff, freelancers work long hours
writing, editing, and researching. According to a recent study, US
freelancers earn only an average of $7,500 per annum.45 Only 16% of
all full-time freelancers earn $30,000 or more. 6  Many freelancers
spend years without any payment.47 And many do not enjoy any of
the benefits that their employed counterparts receive. It is thus not
surprising that freelancers have been commonly cast as the modem
day sweatshop workers. In contrast, it is important to underscore the
main advantages of freelancing: the freedom to choose assignments,
not to have to answer to a supervisor or confront office bureaucracy,
mobility, and ability to take full-time employment or contract for
assignments on a regular or intermittent basis. This independence
poses problems since it is difficult for freelancers to organize
themselves and make each other aware of their rights and
consequently lack effective bargaining power to negotiate contracts
with publishers.
2. The Freelancer-Publisher Relationship
Previous industry practice for freelancers was to submit articles
without an express written contract, 48 typically for one-time print
publishing.49 And because of the quick turn-around time with print
deadlines, the writers' fees were agreed upon and paid once the
43. Kim Goldberg, Taking on Newspaper Chains, 3(3) MEDIA 7, 24 (1996).
44. Santelli, supra note 14, at 262.
45. Nancy DuVergne Smith, The Composite Writers' Lot, National Writers Union
(1995), available at http://members.aol.com/nancyds/wlot2.html (last visited Jul. 4, 2002).
46. Id.
47. Santelli, supra note 14, at 262.
48. Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 906. But see Corbett, supra note 5 (indicating
increasing attempts to formalize the relationship). Absent fieldwork, it is difficult to accurately
gauge the current contractual nature of the author-publisher relationship.
49. Santelli, supra note 14, at 261.
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articles were published. Besides the additional flat fee received,
freelancers customarily obtained additional fees for translations,
reprints, and other modifications of the work. ° Over the last few
years, with the increase in digitization of works, publishers across the
western world have begun to use the digital economy as a new venue
to profit from authors' works. After authors' works have been
published in print, publishers have begun to reproduce such works in
their own databases, sell these to third party databases, or make these
works available on Web sites or CD-ROMs, often under the same pre-
existing oral contracts.
More often than not, this new use of freelancers' works occurs
without their permission. While publishers are paid for the new use
of such works, and attempt to build lucrative electronic publishing
houses, 51 authors continue to go uncompensated. And so in the battle
for electronic rights, freelancers maintain that their livelihoods
depend on whether they can control the copyright in their works.
On the other hand, publishers maintain that they have a vested
interest in securing their digital rights and to own "whatever the next
technological wave brings in."52  For publishers, Web sites and
databases are mere extensions of the original newspaper or periodical,
and not separate media mandating separate payment to authors.
5 3
Media conglomerate strategy is to produce as much copyrighted
material as possible. 4 Publishers are indeed investing millions in the
use of such new technologies. Because of the Internet's
moneymaking potential, many publishers are eager to protect online
property via existing copyright law.56 Since 1996, over 50% of large
daily and weekly newspapers already had online services.5 7  And
while publishers complain about, inter alia,58 illicit digital piracy, the
50. Id.
51. Ann Diamond, The Year of the Rat, CANADIAN FORUM 19, 20 (1996).
52. Santelli, supra note 14, at 265.
53. Diamond, supra note 51.
54. E.g., SIVA VAIDYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THWARTS CREATIVITY (2001).
55. Joia Shillingford, Internet: Copyright Reservations, THE GUARDIAN, June 8, 1995, at
T4.
56. Id.
57. David J. Loundy, Authors Waging Fight in Brave New World, CHICAGO DAILY L
BULLETIN, March 7, 1996.
58. For instance, many writers like Stephen King self-publish on the Web, thereby
supplanting publishers' incomes. Yet, not many freelancers can do this and obtain the same
readers or returns that King does as most are nameless; unless specific queries are entered in
search engines, freelancers remain undiscovered.
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cost savings outweigh such alleged theft.59 Electronic publishing
eliminates the publishing industry middleman-the printer-which
accounts for 40% of costs, 60 and existing data can be supplemented
with little or no turnaround time at a marginal cost of zero.6 '
Publishers traditionally only bargained for first publication rights
since the value of publishing lay almost entirely in being the first to
print. The Internet turned this principle on its head by allowing
publishers to publish cheaply online, where content remains readily
available.62  As a result, digital publishing rights are valuable
commodities and publishers realize that with respect to freelancers
they should obtain all such rights, for the best possible price.63
3. The Freelancer's Digital Disadvantages
Publishing conglomerates of newspapers and magazines are all
in the process of resolving infringement suits lodged against them.
The US National Writer's Union (NWU) estimates that the US
publishing industry could face between $2.5 to $600 billion in
damages for illegally reproducing freelance work alone.64
Nonetheless, despite freelancers' mainly successful mobilization in
the courts, many freelancers' financial situations are worsened by
publishers' continued electronic exploitation of their works.65 Many
writers, often the best, have been forced to stop writing and
consequently sever relations with publishers. 66 For instance, when
Montreal-based travel writer, Nancy Lyon, learned that the Montreal
Gazette sold hundreds of her articles without her consent to third
party databases, she refused to sign an uncompromising digital rights
contract that sought to insulate the newspaper from a possible
infringement suit. As a result, she was forced to forfeit her column.67
One is therefore compelled to question the quality of publishing that
eventually filters to the users of such works, when even the best
59. Christine McGeever, E-Book Piracy Doesn't Frighten Publishers, COMPUTER
WORLD, Apr. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/news/2000/story/0,11280,44382,00.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2002).
60. Id
61. Hanno Ronte, The Impact of Technology on Publishing, 16(4) PUB. REs. Q. 11, 17
(2001).
62. Matthew Hoff, Tasini v. The New York Times: What the Second Circuit Didn't Say, 10
ALB. L.J. SC1. & TECH. 125, 163-64 (1999).
63. Ronte, supra note 61.
64. Simmon Houpt, Freelancers Win Pay for Electronic Rights, G & M, June 6, 2001.
65. Diamond, supra note 51, at 23.
66. Jim Carroll, One Author's Vigilance, 3(3) MEDIA 8, 89 (1996).
67. Diamond, supra note 51, at 23.
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writers, such as Lyon, have difficulties in disseminating their works.
And while many freelancers like Lyon refuse to sell all their rights
and are terminated,68 the vast majority capitulates and signs newer
draconian publishing contracts,6 9 often with waiver of moral rights
and "retroactive rights"70 clauses without any extra compensation.
Freelancers are vulnerable for any number of reasons: they
desperately need the money, lack an industry reputation, or simply
feel subordinate to publishers in their unstable profession. On the
other hand, publishing conglomerates have legal in-house shops with
the knowledge and power to bargain and draft favorable agreements.
As a result, writers either witness their freelancing opportunities or
their potential earnings shrink, while publishers grow more savvy and
appropriate the use of works that they would otherwise be required to
license. Even though publishers may not (yet) charge users for
clicking on their Web sites, they can still make money. New Scientist,
for instance, increased its classified advertising rates by 10% because
of its Web site.7' Moreover, even after favorable rulings, freelancers
continue to be vulnerable to publishers that purge authors' works
from any electronic archives instead of devising payment schemes.72
And here it cannot go unnoticed that the losers are also the users of
such works who experience decreased access to works that would
otherwise be electronically available.73 As noted, and as will be more
fully explored in sections IV through VII, publishers feel justified in
their current behavior. While publishers may not have understood the
extent of their rights when they began electronic publishing,
publishers are now very likely advised of their rights, yet unabashedly
pursue such digital exploitation. Possibly, the publishing business is
reacting to its "competitive advantage... by reallocating intellectual
property rights, making cyber-publishers' commercial transactions
68. Various New York Times columnists have been terminated because they refused to
sign the newer 'digitally-friendly' contracts. Goldberg, supra note 43, at 24.
69. Such "all rights" contracts ask freelancers to relinquish all future publications rights
in applicable works "in any medium or format, now known or later developed, for no additional
fee." See Jonathan T. Elder, Legal Update. Supreme Court to hear Arguments on Electronic
Database Copyrights For Freelance Journalists, 7 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 406, 410 (2001).
70. Such contracts absolve the publishers of any copyright liability for past republication
of the authors' articles in electronic databases or other media. See id. at 410.
71. Mike Holderness, A Few Things You Should Know About Copyright, FREELANCE,
Nov. 22, 2001, available at http://media.gn.apc.org/c-basics.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
72. Jane Martinson, New Media: David Versus Goliath in the Supreme Court, THE
GUARDIAN, July 2, 2001, at 50 (publishers removed about 115,000 articles written by 27,000
journalists between 1980-98 upon the ruling of Tasini v. New York Times), see Tasini v. New
York Times, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
73. See Elder, supra note 69, at 411.
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faster and cheaper by putting the burden of transactional costs on
authors instead."74 Put differently, authors appear to be subsidizing
publishers' entry into the "potentially lucrative electronic world" for
very little in return.
75
4. The Freelancer and the Law
The central issue is whether authors' contracts, by which
copyright is transferred for publishers to print freelancers' works,
contemplate electronic publication rights. Contract law governs the
agreement between freelancer and publisher.76 In order to publish a
freelancer's work, the publisher must have an agreement with the
author granting the publisher an assignment or license to publish the
work. Given that freelancers often have a "handshake" contract with
their publishers, such is regarded by custom as an implied non-
exclusive license to publish the work.77 In other words, absent a
contract, the only rights a publisher acquires from a freelancer are
one-time usage rights.
A license may be either oral or implied-by-conduct and may be
exclusive or non-exclusive. Similar in scope to assignments,78
exclusive licenses must be in writing authorizing the licensee the
power to exercise a right to the exclusion of all other persons
including the licensor.79  In the case of freelancers, their non-
exclusive licenses imply that other licensees (publishers) may be
appointed to compete with one another and the freelancer.8 ° It also
means that in contrast to assignments wherein there is a transfer of
ownership, the freelancers retain ownership-the right to exclude
everyone other than the licensees from use of their works. 81
Assignments and licenses can be partial. For example freelancers
may license only print rights. In Britain, future copyrights can be
74. See Ayers, supra note 15, at 56.
75. Goldberg, supra note 43, at 24.
76. My object is not to look at the general principles of contract law. Rather, the
objective is to look at special rules relating to assignments and licenses of copyright between
freelancers and publishers.
77. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 477.
78. The distinction between licenses and assignments "is not always so clear-cut;" an
exclusive license of all rights to run until the rights expire is in practical reasons like an
assignment. And so, "it is not so much what the contract is called but the effect of the
transaction which decides whether there is an assignment or a license." HILLARY E. PEARSON &
CLIFFORD MILLER, COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 344 (1990).
79. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act ch. 48 § 92(1).
80. VAVER, supra note 21, at 238.
81. See PEARSON & MILLER, supra note 78, at 343.
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assigned,82 thereby vesting copyright in the assignee once the future
work comes into existence. Moral rights can be waived in writing but
cannot be assigned.83 Clearly, had freelancers granted assignments or
exclusive licenses, such would have been in writing and the
contemplation of secondary uses would have most likely been more
easily discernible.
The question therefore is whether the scope of the implied
license extends to online media, absent express terms. While this
matter is to some extent evidentiary and interpretive in kind as it
necessitates an analysis of copyright infringement, it speaks more
fundamentally to the nature of the freelancer-publisher relationship
and, ultimately, to the ways in which such new uses challenge the
very justifications of copyright law and its purported policy
objectives. And so before we can analyze the contemporary legal
construction of such digital contracts, it is necessary to first explore
the freelancer-publisher relationship from a historical perspective, and
then the evolution of copyright in Europe which was the springboard
for both the Anglo-American and continental European traditions.
84
III. THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN RELATION TO THE FREELANCER
A Early Forms of Copyright
1. The System of Privileges
In Britain and across other parts of Europe generally, 85 copyright
during the early sixteenth and seventeenth century served to control
the printing and distribution of books, rather than protect authors'
rights.86  Until the eighteenth century, in England, this form of
protection took the form of privilege or a monopoly handed by the
Crown to certain printers.87 After the introduction of the printing
82. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, ch. 48 § 91.
83. See Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, ch. 48 § 94-95.
84. As I have argued elsewhere and will not develop further in this Article , the once
distinct continental European tradition celebrated for championing authors' rights has diluted to
assimilate to the more capitalistic Anglo-American model; Giuseppina D'Agostino, The
Globalisation of Copyright: A Comparative Analysis of the Anglo-American and Continental
European Copyright Laws in Relation to the Author, 2 HIBERNIAN L. J. 35 (2001).
85. In Italy, printing in the first twenty years of the sixteenth century occurred in forty-
nine different places. ELIZABETH ARMSTRONG, BEFORE COPYRIGHT 11 (1990).
86. Justice Laddie, Copyright: Over-strength, Over-regulated, Over-rated, 5 EIPR 253-
260, at 253 (1996).
87. In 1529, a parliament of Henry VIII enacted a statute (Cum privlegio regali as
impremendum solum) to control the printing of works by Royal prerogative. Select printers
under the statute were known as "King's Printers." E.D. SKONE JAMES, COPINGER & SKONE
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press, Crown licenses were used to regulate the English book trade
and to protect printers against pirates. 8 Authorities also used these
privileges as an instrument of censorship.8 9  The chosen printers"
thus enjoyed an economic advantage, exclusively authorized to print a
select work for a prescribed period of time.91 Since privileges were
valid only within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the area in
which the privilege was effective was relatively small.92 The
invention of the printing press, and the possibility to print multiple
copies of books cheaply, enabled the public to access manuscripts and
books-a privilege previously enjoyed only by the society's most
affluent.93 Notably, the printing press made several innovations
possible: (1) duplications became easier and more accurate, (2) mass
distribution became feasible, and, (3) a larger and more literate
reading public developed. Accordingly, "who owned information and
profited from printed work became crucial questions as this market
developed."
94
In order to profit and adapt to these new means of literary
exploitation, publishers faced several new issues. A consistent theme
present in these early provincial presses was that book production by
patronage was no longer viable in the age of the printed book.95 As
John Feather observes, "[t]o produce a single copy of a printed book
was a commercial and technological nonsense," but to produce large
quantities of books mandated a marketing and distribution system that
the patrons did not have.96 Simultaneously, the expanse of printing
and the increasing competition among printers led to a situation in all
the major European countries in which "piracy was born, so to speak,
JAMES ON COPYRIGHT (Skone James ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998).
88. Edward Earle, The Effect of Romanticism on the 19'h Century Development of
Copyright Law, 6 INTELL. PROP. J. 269, 271 (1991).
89. Id.
90. Throughout this Article the terms "printer," "bookseller," "stationer," and "publisher"
will be used interchangeably. Much of the canvassed literature on the history of copyright often
blurs these terms. PINKUS, supra note 1.
91. When William Caxton introduced printing into England in 1476, he sought no
privilege as he enjoyed the support of the Yorkist dynasty. His business flourished without the
need for protection against competitors on his territory. Caxton is cast as an entrepreneur of his
times, by making a profitable business by carefully selecting titles that would sell to a small but
well-defined market. JOHN FEATHER, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 10 (1988).
92. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 85, at 10-11.
93. GILLIAN DAVIES, IIC STUDIES MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE MUNICH, COPYRIGHT AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 13 (1994).
94. DEBORA j. HALBERT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE
POLITICS OF EXPANDING OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 3 (1999).
95. See FEATHER, supra note 91, at 15.
96. Id.
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with the art itself. ' 97  The printers and publishers soon forged
powerful guilds and petitioned the authorities for protection against
unfair competition.98 With the Cromwellian Revolution, a series of
Parliamentary ordinances abolished the system of privileges. 99 These
ordinances prohibited a book to be printed unless it was first
licensed. 0 0 In 1662, the Licensing Act1 ' was passed which granted
perpetual protection to those who registered a work with the
Stationers' Company.102 Any book had to be first licensed and then
registered as a copy with the Stationers. The Licensing Act further
prescribed regulations as to printing books that were hostile to the
Church or government and prohibited the import of any work, without
the consent of the owner.10 3  Under the Stationers' guild only its
members could hold copyright. In other words, the Stationers had a
virtual monopoly over all printed material. Where did authors fit in?
How did they earn a living under these early regimes?
2. Authors in the Early Days
The literature canvassed on these early times suggests that
authors were not duly considered. 1°4 Under the early system of
privileges, the select printers who were familiar with the taste of their
public would commission an author to write certain works. 105 But this
arrangement was quickly abused to protect industrial interests.
Booksellers had to make more costly investments, and revenue came
later and less reliably and competition in the form of counterfeit
copies became severe. 106 Many bankruptcies resulted. According to
Mich~le Vessillier-Ressi, in order to protect the owners of capital, the
authority granted privileges and, in doing so, forgot about the authors
97. See DAVIES, supra note 93, at 16.
98. E.g., MARK ROSE, THE AUTHORS PROPRIETOR: DONALDSON V. BECKET AND THE
GENEALOGY OF MODERN AUTHORSHIP IN OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 25 (1994).
99. See DAVIES, supra note 93, at 18.
100. Id.
101. Licensing Act 1662 13 & 14 Car 2 c. 33 (Eng.).
102. The Stationer's Company, a descendant of certain craft guilds of printers who had
moved to the City of London in the early sixteenth century, was created by Henry Vill and
chartered in 1557 by Philip and Mary to create a specific organization through which the Crown
could maintain the status quo. See FEATHER, supra note 91, at 13.
103. See SKONE JAMES, supra note 83, at 2-11.
104. I make no distinction between authors and freelancers, "partly because the categories
overlap, partly because journalism can hardly be identified as a separate profession before, say,
the 1700s." VICTOR BONHAM-CARTER, AUTHORS BY PROFESSION 5 (1978). To the extent that
specific commentary is available pertinent to freelancers, I will incorporate accordingly.
105. For instance, almanacs and astrological and medical 'prognostications.'
106. MICHELE VESSILLIER-RESSi, THE AUTHOR'S TRADE 13 (1993).
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who were "relegated to the sphere of private agreements and, by the
force of economic necessity, to a condition of inferiority in relation to
the businessmen."' 7 As a result, authors had no explicit, recognized
place in this scheme. jo8 Once the system of privileges was abolished,
not much changed as authors faced similarly unfavorable
circumstances since "[t]he emergence of copyright endorsed the
Stationer's Company right to copy rather than the author's right to
own."' 0 9 Nonetheless, Stationer's did acknowledge an obligation to
pay authors and obtain permission prior to printing their works.' 10
But not all authors were commissioned. Patron-less authors would
think up a title and propose the future work to the first bookseller who
was willing to pay anything for it.
By the seventeenth century, publishers customarily offered
honoraria to the writers for the works the publishers conceded to
print. "' But institutions, in honorarium, gave authors a mere
acknowledgement. Consequently, writers were not afforded value for
their work. Moreover, while the more respectable writers, the
gentlemen, supported themselves by some means of patronage (by
way of some direct gift or a political sinecure) for which they paid
with some fulsome dedications and political loyalty, the vast majority
had to supplement their income with other types of employment.'
2
Some freelance authors would typically earn two or three shillings per
title. 13 The hacks had no patron and depended entirely on their own
efforts. Those in Grub Street wrote in a "highly competitive cut-
throat society, dominated by a handful of entrepreneurs....,, 1 4  The
107. Id. at 13.
108. F. Willem Grosheide, PARADIGMS OF COPYRIGHT LAW, OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS:
ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 203 (Brad Sherman & Alan Stowel eds., Clarendon Press Oxford
1994).
109. See HALBERT, supra note 94, at 4.
110. Often the author would receive a small advance if the title inspired confidence. He
could then proceed to produce the manuscript. There were four arrangements possible when a
book was written: (1) lump sum payment or free copies (most popular arrangement); (2)
publishing by subscription in the case of encyclopedias; fee determined in advance but only
rendered once volumes were delivered; (3) profit share once printing cost recovered (seldom
used and certain to substantially disadvantage authors since publishers would 'cook' the books
regarding printing expenses) and; (4) self-publishing. See VESSILLIER-RESSI, supra note 106, at
14.
Ill. See Woodmansee, supra note 29, at 434.
112. The author received some type of security in the form of a job as a secretary, tutor,
chaplain, actor, librarian or political agent; profits from monopolies and property were also
possible. See CARTER, supra note 104, at 12.
113. See CARTER, supra note 104, at 13. The period's account-books indicate that bread
was a shilling a loaf and a plain suit 2.14 pounds. PINKUS, supra note 1, at 14.
114. See CARTER, supra note 104, at 28.
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system of patronage only ensured a relative degree of independence
and security for the author. Mainly because "patronage was a
personal link, it would often end on the death (or disgrace or ruin) of
the patron. It was also biased, irregular and unfair; it encouraged
flattery as much as talent."' 
1 5
In the 1690s, for the first time, it seemed possible for hacks to
live by their writing: "[i]t was a precarious independence, but it gave
them the kind of moral assurance, in that heavy interval between their
cups and their whores, to sneer at patron-seekers like Dryden."'116
This independence was due to a convergence of circumstances;
Pinkus highlights four main factors: (1) more readers, (2) less
enforcement, (3) a compact market, and (4) powerful political parties
who needed writers.11 7  But importantly, the hack's independence
often landed him in another kind of bondage, to his bookseller-
publisher.
These were the enterprising business-men like the 'unspeakable
Curll', who kept stables of writers, slept them three to a bed,
according to Amory, advanced them money for work which, it
must be confessed, they sometimes had no intention of completing
but, finished or not, was never sufficient for expense after they had
paid their wine bill. The result was a familiar pattern. They got in
debt, they went hungry, they skulked the streets to avoid the bum-
bailiffs set on them by their landlord or their tailor, they even went
without their wine.1
The publisher also took on a different status, becoming less and
less the stationer and bookseller and more the publisher competing to
protect his property rights as we see today.
The Licensing Act of 1662 had been continued by several Acts
of Parliament but expired in 1679.1" 9 The system had fallen into
disrepute since the power of the Stationer's members to claim
copyright in perpetuity caused price increases and a lack of
availability of books.120  Two main streams of copyright protection
115. See VESSILLIER-RESSI, supra note 106, at 11.
116. PINKUS, supra note 1, at 15. Several factors made this possible including, inter alia,
the political alliances that writers forged. When William III came to the throne, the political
party, not the court, became the center of patronage, and the political value of the writer
increased. The great political leaders wooed him. By the beginning of the eighteenth century
all the great writers of the time-Addison, Steele, Switft, Prior, Defoe-were involved in
politics on one side or another of the party war.
117. Id. at 17.
118. Id. at17.
119. See SKONE JAMES, supra note 87, at 2-12.
120. See SKONE JAMES, supra note 87, at 2-11.
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with some key differences were born: 21 the Anglo-American tradition
in Britain, following the first English copyright in 1710 and the
continental European tradition in other parts of Europe, following the
French revolutionary laws of 1791 and 1793.122
B. The Birth of Modern Copyright Law
1. The Genesis of British Copyright: The Statute of Anne
Since the Licensing Act expired, the Stationers petitioned the
House of Commons for further legislation in order to reinstate
perpetual protection. 123 In response to these applications, the Statute
of Anne 124 officially ended the system of privileges, granted the
author copyright protection, and aimed to encourage the composition
of socially desirable works and prevent the practice of piracy. 125 The
Statute limited the term of protection for unpublished works to
fourteen years, and for published authors who had not transferred
their rights and booksellers who had acquired the copy of any book in
order to print them, to twenty-one years. 126 The publication had to be
listed with the Stationer's Company, and nine copies had to be
delivered to certain libraries. 127  The author technically gained the
right to control the publishing of his work and protect it against
piracy. 128 But in reality, "an author had to assign the copyright in
order to be paid-otherwise, no bookseller would publish the work,
and without a printed book there could be no copyright.' 1 9 Authors
often sold their works for a flat fee and gave up rights to publication
121. The protection of literary works came to be recognized as a fundamental right of man
in the American Constitution (1787) and in the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789)
premised on the French Constitution (1791). GIUSEPPE SENA, OPERE DELL'INGEGNO IN
DIGESTO DELLE DISCIPLINE PRIVATISTICHE: SEZIONE COMMERCIALE, MODE-PATRI X 356, 357
(1994).
122. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, a 'clean break' had been made with the
past. The relationship between authors and their works was celebrated. This relationship is
based on gius-naturalistiche laiche, a concept derived from the celebrated dictum of Le
Chapelier: "la plus sacree, la plus personelle de toutes les propriet~s est 1 ouvrage, fruit de la
pensge d'un &rivain." C. UBERTAZZI 'DIRITTO D'AUTORE' IN DIGEST CIV IV C UBERTAZZI
(ED) 368 (1989).
123. See SKONE JAMES, supra note 87.
124. 8 Anne c 19 (1710) (Eng.) (hereinafter "the Statute").
125. See DAVIES, supra note 93, at 23.
126. See Earle, supra note 88, at 274.
127. See SKONE JAMES, supra note 87, at 2-15.
128. N.N. Feltes, International Copyright: Structuring "The Condition of Modernity" in
British Publishing, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 535, 539 (1992).
129. LYMAN PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 27
(1991).
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and any further royalties because booksellers printed works at will.
130
There are various perspectives advanced as to why, in 1710, the
first copyright act was born. According to a prevailing view, the
Statute was "the result of lobbying by and for established London-
based publishers and booksellers seeking new legal weapons against
down-market competition spawned by the proliferation of print-
technology.' 13' Others argue that copyright grew directly out of the
efforts at suppression of piracy.132 And yet others maintain that while
the Stationers justified that the system prevented the publication of
seditious works, they were more interested in preserving their
monopoly. 33  On the other hand, Parliament's main objective in
limiting the term of copyright and, for the first time, in introducing
the author into its provisions, was to restrain the London booksellers'
monopoly. 134  Some scholars thus offer that the Statute was not
intended as a copyright protection act, but as a book trade regulation
act. 135  My interest here is not to choose the best perspective, but
rather to highlight that these viewpoints share the same underlying
principle: the Statute was not an author's statute, but a publisher's
statute. Copyright has traditionally been a publisher's right and not
an author's right.' 36 Both parliament and publishers were interested
in some type of regulation-whether this was to stymie publishers'
competition or to stymie publishers' monopoly is beyond the scope of
this Article.
2. The Authorship Debate
To understand why copyright became associated with protection
of the author, at this juncture, it is important to contextualize the
intellectual dimensions of the author-publisher relationship. At the
time, publishers deployed the emerging discourse on authorship to
advance the publishers' cause for copyright protection. As Ray
130. See HALBERT, supra note 94, at 5.
131. Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 296 (1992). See also ROSE, supra note 98, at 23;
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS (1993); Laddie, supra note 86, at 253; LYNETTE OWEN,
SELLING RIGHTS 26 (3d ed., Routledge London (2001)).
132. David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word, 55 L & CONTEMP. AFFAIRS, 127-135,
128 (1992).
133. See OWEN, supra note 131, at 9. Publishers were suffering as a result of unlicensed
copyists, in a regime where common law remedies were ineffective. See Laddie, supra note 86.
But see HALBERT, supra note 94, at 5 (stating that the Stationers' Company was not
automatically affected by the loss of the Licensing Act because they were a book cartel).
134. L.R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143 (1968).
135. See HALBERT, supra note 94.
136. See ROSE, supra note 98, at 27.
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Patterson offers, "although the author had never held copyright, his
interest was always promoted by the stationers as a means to their
end." 137 In contrast to the fifteenth and sixteenth century, where the
author was merely a craftsman or the vehicle relaying the divine, in
the eighteenth century the author became the actual "genius" innately
inspired and thus capable of producing original work.138 While Mark
Rose studied the emergence of the proprietary author in England,
Martha Woodmansee focused on Germany. Woodmansee
acknowledges the work of Edward Young' 39 as he makes "a writer's
ownership of his work the necessary, and even sufficient condition for
earning the honorific title of "author" and he makes such ownership
contingent upon a work's originality."' 140 This change was partly due
to the fact that writers were no longer dependent on patrons for
remuneration, as they had an expanding public audience. In addition
to a larger and more literate audience, "writings would get sold not
because they were skilful variants, but because they were original."' 41
However, it is not entirely accurate to paint the need to protect a
work solely as an urgency to preserve in perpetuity the romantic
notion of "originality."' 142 Authors still wanted to earn their livelihood
through their authorship. Once writers were compensated with a flat
sum for any work rendered, they lost their rights to any further profits
flowing from the work. As a result, writers found difficulty in
"keeping up the pretence" of a just arrangement, and were no longer
content about not being appropriately compensated for their work. 143
137. PATTERSON, supra note 134.
138. William Wordsworth (1770-1850) championed this aura of originality as intrinsic in
the author. In the 'Recluse' Wordsworth celebrated the 'exquisite individual Mind.' WILLIAM
WORDWORTH, "THE RECLUSE" IN SELECTED POEMS AND PREFACES 45 (J. Stillinger ed.,
Houghton Mifflin Boston 1965).
139. Edward Young spurred German theorists, like Herder, Goethe, Kant and Fichte to
claim ownership over the products of their labor in the form of copyright nearly half a century
earlier. Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition in a Letter to the Author of Sir
Charles Grandison, ENGLISH CRITICAL ESSAY, SIXTEENTH, SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH
CENTURIES (Jones ed., OUP London 1975).
140. See Woodmansee, supra note 28, at 431.
141. Thomas Mallon, The Origins and Ravages of Plagiarism, 43 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y.
37, 38 (1995).
142. Essentially the view espoused by Earle; see Earle, supra note 84.
143. See Woodmansee, supra note 29, at 436. Woodmansee and Rose's views on
authorship do not stand uncontested. Halbert highlights the eighteenth century French
experience referring to Carla Hesse's Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship
in Revolutionary France, 1777-1793, wherein Hesse argues that the French Revolution
provided a different starting point for the debate over authorship. On the one hand, there was
the notion of the public good and on the other, the notion of the proprietary author-both
important to understanding copyright law. "It is clear that these tensions continue to prevail
today." See HALBERT, supra note 94, at 10.
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In order to extend their monopolies, the English booksellers
appropriated the concept of authorship as a justification with positive
connotations to designate literary activity as socially meritorious.
144
One of the main arguments lodged by the booksellers to reinstate
copyright protection was that failure to continue with exclusive
printing rights was a disincentive to authors. Barring such protection
to encourage authors, the public interest would be harmed by the
decreased flow of books. 145 To substantiate such submissions, several
scholars 146 posit that the booksellers co-opted the Lockean discourse
of possessive individualism to justify the new literary property
market. The author was a proprietor inherently deserving of the fruits
of his labor. The author as owner of ideas was likened to an owner of
property threatened by trespassers on his land. 147 The literary work
began to be seen as a "form of estate." 148  Such ideas therefore
contributed to a new way of thinking about literature. Although
Locke opposed licensing as leading to unreasonable monopolies
injurious to learning, in addition to the Stationers' pleas in 1690 he
"demanded a copyright for authors which he justified by the time and
effort expended in the writing of the work which should be rewarded
like any other work."1 49  And so, all of these developments, the
emergence of the mass market of books, the valorization of the
original genius, and the development of the Lockean discourse of
possessive individualism occurred in the same period as the long legal
and commercial struggle over copyright.
1 50
3. The Battle of the Booksellers
In 1731, twenty-one years after the Statute was passed, the
Stationer's monopoly of printing books already in print had expired.
Printers in Scotland and other provinces re-issued editions of old
books and the London booksellers filed suits to prevent this in a series
of cases before the English and Scottish courts. 15 1 The booksellers
argued that at common law authors had a perpetual right to authorize
144. See Jaszi, supra note 131, at 296.
145. PATrERSON, supra, note 134.
146. See ROSE, supra note 98, at 31; Daniel Burkitt, Copyrighting Culture, 2 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 146 (2001); See SKONE JAMES,supra note 87, at 2-13.
147. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 17 (1993).
148. See Lange, supra note 132, at 128. "Indeed, were it not for the press, relentlessly
propagating the linear text, intellectual property as we know it simply could not exist."
149. See SKONE JAMES, supra note 87, at 2-13; J. LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF
GOVERNMENT 27 (P. Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1988).
150. See Earle, supra note 88, at 272.
151. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 12 (1967).
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printing rights, which had been assigned to them. 152
At issue was whether copyright was an inherent form of property
arising from the act of creation or a limited right of control or
monopoly bestowed by the Statute. This battle again used the
developing discourse on authors' rights as its tool.
153
In 1774, Donaldson v. Becket154 finally overturned Millar v.
Taylor's earlier decision' 55 holding that copyright was a statutory
right and was to be treated as statutory property. Consequently, the
Statute extinguished the common law copyright in published works.
The Statute succeeded in fixing the idea that copyright was an
author's right. And even though future law limited this right, it began
with the important assumption that authors had rights invested in their
works. 156  Yet, while copyright had been transformed from a
publisher's to an author's right it ultimately benefited the booksellers.
According to Patterson:
The change, however, was less a boon to authors than to
publishers, for it meant that copyright was to have another function.
Rather than being simply the right of a publisher to be protected
against piracy, copyright would henceforth be a concept embracing all
rights that an author might have in his published work. And since
copyright was still available to the publisher, the change meant also
that the publisher as copyright owner would have the same rights as
the author.
157
Thus, although the battle of the booksellers did not result in a
perpetual copyright, it helped further advance the legal concepts of
proprietary author and literary work underpinning western
copyright.1
58
4. Battling for More Copyright
In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the idea of literary
152. Id. at 12.
153. See HALBERT, supra note 94, at 6.
154. Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
155. Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B. 1769) (holding in favor of perpetual
right by a majority-the Statute did not take the common law right away).
156. See HALBERT, supra note 94.
157. PATTERSON, supra note 134, at 151.
158. Feather notes that Donaldson reversed the "entire tradition of the law of copyright"
and moved towards the definition of two key concepts in copyright law: the development of
"intellectual property law" as a creation of the author's intellect, and that of the "public domain"
which terminated the author's ownership, but not his creation. John Feather, Publishers and
Politicians: The Remaking of Copyright in Britain 1774-1842, 24 PUBLISHING HISTORY 49
(1988).
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property, the theft of such property, and the struggle for an
international copyright law all took center stage. 159 In 1724, the first
commercial publishing house had been founded in Britain, under the
family firm name Longman. Arguably, the first British publishing
house was born when the University of Cambridge received a Royal
Charter to print in 1534, followed by the University of Oxford in
1586.160 There was a real burgeoning of commercial houses in Britain
and across the western world. Yet, we can see the ongoing world-
wide injustice of the copyright regime through the lens of the
common writer.' 6 1 Paul Gleason notes that the US, which adopted its
first copyright law in 1790, commonly reprinted European, mainly
English, works "without either requesting permission or making
payment....,,162 And though this was clearly piracy for the
Europeans, as Charles Dickens and Sir Walter Scott publicly
condemned, it was completely legal for the US to protect only its
national authors. 63  Compelled to protect the products of their
intellect, in early 1870, many authors who had works pirated by
European publishers publicly supported international copyright law
and protection for local artists. 64  Authors were concerned mainly
with moral rights, 65 objecting to publication without consent, false
attribution of authorship, and modifications to the text that were
harmful to their reputation. 66 The genesis of the modem intellectual
property law system was established.
5. Conclusions
Copyright has traditionally been "a publisher's, not an author's
right."' 67 Copyright emerged because of the economic interests of the
booksellers. First, they wanted protection, then they wanted it
forever, then they settled with what they could get, and then they
159. Jerrald Ranta, Dickinson's "Alone and in a Circumstance" and the Theft of
Intellectual Property, 41 ESQ 65, 65 (1995).
160. See OWEN, supra, note 131, at 4.
161. Emily Dickinson's Alone in a Circumstance (1870), reveals the property-laden ethos
filtering her epoch's copyright discourse where copyrightless authors' works were appropriated
without remuneration.
162. Paul Gleason, Major International Copyright Conventions, 15 ACQUISITION
LIBRARIAN 5, 7 (1996).
163. E.g. JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS 6, 166-69 (1994); N.N.
Feltes, International Copyright: Structuring "The Condition of Modernity" in British
Publishing, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 535, 539 (1992).
164. Ranta, supra note 159, at 74.
165. See DAVIES, supra note 93, at 17.
166. Id.
167. See ROSE, supra note 98, at 27.
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protected it from any perpetrator. To summarize copyright law's
historical underpinnings, it is useful to quote Jeremy Waldron's story:
The reasoning goes like this. The overall social good is served by
the progress of science and useful arts. The progress of science and
useful arts is served by the encouragement of authors. The
encouragement of authors is secured by providing them with the
incentive of legally secured monopoly profits from the sale and
circulation of their works over a limited period of time. Incentives
work by conferring benefits on those whose activity we are trying
to encourage. Such a benefit may be seen as a reward for their
efforts. Rewards are what we characteristically provided for moral
desert; we reward the deserving and penalize the undeserving.
Therefore, authors deserve the intellectual property rights that are
secured to them in the name of social policy. The thought moves
from encouragement to incentive to benefit to reward to desert, so
that something which starts off as a matter of desirable social
policy ends up entrenched in an image of moral entitlement. 168
Missing from this traditional account is, "the step where authors
transfer their bundles of sticks to the publisher who then holds sole
proprietary interest over the work and continues to profit with very
little going back to the authors.', 169 From the early days, publishers
sought to exploit new lucrative technologies, like the press, with very
little regard for authors.
It is not surprising then that in practice, the new "authors' rights"
did not remain with authors for long, as writers continued to sell their
works outright for lump sum payments. 170  Whereas before the
Statute's enactment, the author had to sell his copyright outright, after
the enactment he was "required to sell only one edition or only for a
period of fourteen years-that is, if he was prepared to brave the
wrath of the publisher upon whom he depended for his livelihood."' 7'
Historically, the author appeared to be both a pawn for the booksellers
and for the draftsmen, and less the object of social policy.
168. Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers, 68 CHi.-KENT. L. REV. 841, 851 (1993)
(emphasis added).
169. See HALBERT, supra note 94, at 18.
170. See CARTER, supra note 104, at 17-25.
171. Sampson, Copyright & Electronic Publishing, 75 COPYRIGHT WORLD 22-6 (1997).
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IV. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT MECHANISMS AND DIGITAL
PUBLISHING
A. International Copyright Mechanisms
1. The Berne Convention
United under the leadership of authors, various groups of artists
called for changes in their social position on an international legal
scale, which eventually led to the establishment of the Berne
Convention.172  Signed in 1886, the Berne Convention for the
protection of Literary and Artistic Works 73 was the culmination of
numerous efforts to establish a multilateral arrangement for the
protection of authors' .rights that would replace the previous
piecemeal and incomplete network of bilateral agreements. The
Chairman of the final conference, Numa Droz said of the occasion:
"the spectacular affirmation of the awakening of the universal
conscience in favor of authors."' 7 4  Not surprisingly, Berne-at its
inception-did not contemplate digital uses of authors' works, but has
become applicable to many online activities. 175
Berne has three key obligations. First, Berne prohibits signatory
states from requiring procedural formalities as a prerequisite for
national treatment of copyrighted works. 176  Second, Berne's
"national treatment" grants the same copyright protections for foreign
nationals as those given to works of national origin. 177  This
eliminates the need for a formal reciprocity inquiry, and overcomes
many of the historical imbalances of copyright protection. ' Third,
Berne adopts certain minimum standards of protection for foreign
authors; albeit subject to national implementation and interpretation,
every Berne signatory country must give authors the exclusive right to
172. Grosheide, supra note 108, at 215.
173. Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, T.S.
No. 185 (hereinafter "Berne").
174. Grosheide, supra note 108, at 215.
175. Sampson, supra note 171.
176. Bere, supra note 173, at art. 5(2).
177. Craig Karpe, Towards a Unifying Law: international copyright conventions, the
GATT TRIPs Agreement and Related EC Regulations, 5(2) INFO. & COMMS. TECH. L. 95, 97
(1996).
178. This principle applies to both substantive and procedural areas of law and
consequently simplifies international relations as countries no longer have to negotiate and
maintain bilateral arrangements. MARSHALL LEAFFER, THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (2d ed., Washington 1997).
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authorize the exploitation of their copyright materials.179 Marshall
Leaffer offers that Berne's minimum rights principle provides a
"common denominator" of legal protection to all member countries
and helps harmonize international laws.' 80
Nonetheless, Berne cannot be said to be entirely an author's
statute. An author's exploitation rights under Berne include the right
to reproduce, perform, recite, and communicate literary works to the
public. 18' Yet, since neither "work" nor "author" are defined terms,
the law of the contracting state has to decide what is a work and who
is an author.' 82  Moreover, while Berne protects an author's droit
moral or, moral rights, it was not until the Rome revision of 1928 that
moral rights were established. 8 3 Grosheide suggests that Berne only
protected the pecuniary interests of authors. 84 Additionally, while
the author can claim authorship and challenge any distortion,
mutilation, modification of the work, or other derogatory action in
relation to it which would be prejudicial to the author's honor or
reputation, 185 such rights are curtailed by certain exceptions. The
CDPA, for instance, does not provide for derogatory actions in the
case of freelancers' works.
Additionally, Paul Sampson argues that authors are at a
disadvantage when important national differences complicate
electronic publishing matters.' 86 Berne's copyright protection of 50
years compared to that of the EU of 70 years for instance means that
authors and publishers have to enforce their own copyrights against
inflingers using these different laws, and the outcome may vary in
different countries. As a result, publishers using the Internet need to
obtain legal advice to assess their risk in every country. Sampson
maintains that this may mean that publishers have to abandon an
online project because of problems in a few countries. 187  While
perhaps unrealistic, authors may face less public exposure not so
much because of the problems outlined at the outset vis-A-vis the
179. Sampson, supra note 171, at 24.
180. LEAFFER, supra note 178, at 7.
181. Berne, supra note 173, at art. 2.
182. This distinction lies in the differences that existed between the signatories on these
points; namely, those of the continental European droit d'auteur tradition and those of the
Anglo-American tradition. Grosheide, supra note 108, at 218. But see, David Vaver, Copyright
in Foreign Works: Canada's International Obligations, CANADIAN BAR REVIEW 76 (1987).
183. Grosheide, supra note 108, at 216.
184. Id. at 216.
185. Berne, supra note 173.
186. Sampson, supra note 171, at 24.
187. Id. at 24.
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entrepreneurial publishers, but more because of the publishers'
management of the uneven nature of the legal system. And while
ways to overcome this issue are available, 18 8 the structural issues that
underpin the freelancer-publisher relationship can be exacerbated in
this scheme. Also, because copyright law has been integrated with
the laws of unfair competition and intellectual property, by its very
nature, it serves the competitive process of market-driven societies.
189
To this end, Sampson argues that Berne has divided the world into
different markets wherein authors and publishers can charge more in
one country than they can in another, since printed copies cannot
move without the author's permission.1 90 This is justifiable since the
demand and cost of materials, labor, and distribution are different in
every part of the world and this has to be reflected in the sale price.
But as noted, because online publishing eliminates printing costs,
there should be no substantial pricing differences among countries.
While both authors and publishers can profit from this outcome, the
law does not state that authors remain the right holders warranting a
share in the online revenue. As a result, assuming publishers do take
advantage of Berne's pricing barriers, the extra revenue will unlikely
be passed on to authors. 19' Beme was therefore established to hasten
the quick turnover of publishing capital, and ensure reciprocity in the
treatment of authors "or most often, of publishers [the author's
'lawful representatives'] within signatory nations."' 92 Berne, like the
Statute of Anne, was not entirely initiated to protect authors' rights, or
at least in practice does not appear to. Indeed, Berne like the Statute
of Anne is only of symbolic significance for authors since once
authors assign copyright they lose any entitlement to their work.
Berne does not do much to advance authors' interests; authors remain
subject to publishers or nations, and nations are arguably also subject
to publishers.
2. TRIPS
The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the GATT negotiations
concluded with the addition of broad initiatives in intellectual
property rights as embodied in the section "Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
188. Id. at 24. (proposing that as an alternative to enforcing rights in national courts
enforcing copyright through intemet service providers is "as good as an injunction").
189. Grosheide, supra 108, at 219.
190. Sampson, supra note 171, at 24-25.
191. id. at 25 (explaining that the Treaty of Rome provides sanctions within the EU
against publishers who charge more in one country than in another).
192. Feltes, supra note 128, at 540.
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Counterfeit Goods" (TRIPS).'93 TRIPS was intended to be a
comprehensive plan to strengthen and harmonize standards of
international intellectual property protection and tackle growing
multi-billion dollar piracy problems. Especially heralded by western
copyright industries, TRIPS was meant to facilitate and encourage the
trade of products and services involving copyrighted works.194 TRIPS
offers aggressive measures to suppress copyright infringers, including
trade sanctions, injunctions, and seizure of infringing goods.' 95
Further, in stipulating minimum standards of protection, TRIPS gives
leeway to member nations to implement more extensive legal
protection. Consequently, many pro-business commentators have
favored TRIPS mainly because of its enforcement powers. 196
While TRIPS mirrors the Berne provisions and specifically
requires signatories to comply with Berne's appendix and Articles 1-
21, it does less for authors. Authors' moral rights are expressly
excluded from TRIPS. 197 TRIPS is thus said to adopt a Berne-minus
clause. 198 Various commentators speculate that this concession was a
result of appeasing US demands. 199 TRIPS may facilitate exploitation
by publishers who are not obliged to fully respect the creator.
Moreover, like Berne, TRIPS does not define the foundational
concept of "author." In the common law world, copyright's purpose
is to protect investments of time, effort, and capital in the creation of
literary work, whether these are made by individual authors or
corporations, whereas in authors' rights jurisdictions, copyright's
purpose is to protect authors' inherent entitlements. 200 It is thus
unclear the extent to which authors across common law and civilian
jurisdictions would be protected. Lastly, TRIPS does not adequately
contemplate digital issues, let alone those concerning authors.
193. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex I C, Legal Instruments-Results of The Uruguay Rounds vol. 31-33 I. L. M.
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
194. Karpe, supra note 177, at 96.
195. TRIPS Agreement, supra 193, at art. 44 (providing that domestic courts can order the
closure of any operation to bar infringing goods from market entry).
196. C. LEVY, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH & PUBLIC POLICY HALIFAX, THE UNITED
STATES PERSPECTIVE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE GATT 167 (G. Smith ed., 1991).
197. TRIPS Agreement, supra 189, at art. 9(1).
198. Alexander Caviedes, International Copyright Law: Should the European Union
Dictate its Development, 16 BU INT'L L.J. 165, 199 (1998).
199. Carlos Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America: Is
There Still Room For Differentiation, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 129 (1997).
200. Id. at 127-28.
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B. Digital Copyright Mechanisms
1. WIPO Copyright Treaty
As a result of WIPO's December 1996 diplomatic conference,
the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 201 was instituted to supplement
Berne and usher copyright law into the digital era. To fully
implement the WCT, countries have to upgrade their copyright laws.
The WCT confirms Beme and boasts added digital obligations on
subscribing countries. Copyright holders are explicitly given control
over putting material online or making it available.2 °2 Further, states
must include sanctions against: (1) persons who engage in activities
related to the circumvention of technological measures that inhibit
infringement (for example, encryption), and (2) deliberate
interference with electronic rights management information (for
example, digital watermarking).2 °3 The logic here is to facilitate
authors' calculation and collection of royalties.2 °4
In relation to authors' moral rights, the WCT does not require
more moral rights obligations than what Berne sets as minimum.20 5
Also, Article 6 on the "right of distribution" empowers neighboring
rights or distributors of copyright materials such as publishers, to
prevent copying to the distributed form of the work. Moreover, the
WCT adopts Berne's Article 9 on the right of reproduction and
equally permits contracting states to provide limitations and
exceptions as long as these do not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work and prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.
While some commentators reason that the WCT provides a
"measured and balanced response to the digital age, 20 6 others argue
201. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, Doc. CRNR/DC/89 [hereinafter WCT]; The
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Doc. CRNR/DC/90 (negotiating to bring
"neighbor rights in the digital era). Together these two treaties are commonly referred to as the
"Internet Treaties." International Intellectual Property Alliance at
http://www.iipa.com/multilateral.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001) (stating the WCT is formerly
referred to as the Berne Protocol and is not yet in effect since 24 countries to date have ratified it
and a total of 30 signatory countries is necessary).
202. WCT, supra note 20 1, at art. 8.
203. Industry Canada, Consultation Pater On Digital Copyright Issues, at
http://www.Strategis.ic.gc.ca (last visited Jun. 22, 2001).
204. Sampson, supra note 171, at 23-25.
205. David Vaver, Internationalizing Copyright Law: Implementing the WIPO Treaties,
OXFORD ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Jan. 1998), at
http://www.oiprc.oxacuk/EJWPO199.html.
206. Thomas C. Vinje, The New WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Happy Result in Geneva,
19(5) EIPR 230, 230 (1997).
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that the WCT's basic purpose was to strengthen the rights of the
copyright industries in the digital age.2°7 For Pamela Samuelson, the
WIPO digital agenda resulted largely from American influence to
promote its national interest in protecting its burgeoning exports of
copyrights.208 The WCT offers very little consideration to authors
since "WIPO officials do not seem to have noticed that copyright
industries have lately been posturing themselves in the international
intellectual property policy arena as though their interests and the
interests of authors coincide when, in fact, they diverge in some
significant respects. 20 9 Indeed, the WCT's legislative focus concerns
issues that are more suited to right holders, such as the appropriate
treatment for automatically-made transient copies and infringement-
enabling technologies which undercut their potential revenue.
210
Arguably, such measures are antithetical to copyright policy, let alone
authors' interests.211 It is thus somewhat of a challenge to analyze the
WCT and its contemplation of authors' rights because it really does
not concern authors. But just because WIPO officials have ignored
authors does not mean that contracting states should. Yet, states have
a vested interest to support substantive digital protection measures
since these strengthen a commercial agenda.
Shira Perlmutter highlights the many silences in the WCT 212
which, while explicitly not part of the WIPO mandate, may merit
contemplation in light of freelancers' digital issues. Functional
systems for online licensing are still matters to be resolved within the
contracting states since the WCT no more than sets the stage for
adoption and implementation.21 3 Consequently, issues of relevance to
authors generally, such as the divergence of national decisions on
freelancers' digital rights that may pose legal problems for
international trade in copyrighted works 214 or the online transfer of
copyrights, are not addressed. And so, irrespective of the merits of
the WCT's added rights, in order for freelancers to benefit from these
technologies, they must necessarily hold the copyrights. And in the
207. Vaver, supra note 205.
208. Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual Property Organization and
the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Council in Regulating Intellectual
Property Rights in the Information Age, 21(11) EIPR 536, 536, 578-591, (1991).
209. Id.
210. Vinje, supra note 206, at 230.
211. Industry Canada, supra note 203.
212. Shira Perlmutter, Convergence and the Future of Copyright, 2 EIPR 111, 114 (2001).
213. Id.
214. Ayers, supra note 15, at 29 (discussing the private international law aspects of
enforcing author's rights).
2002]
68 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19
absence of concise and favorable copyright transfer agreements in the
digital environment, it is more likely that the right holder is the
publisher. Also, some stakeholders have commented on the ill-
consideration for the users of copyrighted materials consistent with
important public policy objectives; WCT shuns educational
institutions, libraries, museums, and archives,21 5 all of which
freelancers heavily rely on for their works. Finally, it should not go
unmentioned that, like Berne, the WCT lacks enforcement power.
216
Essentially, legislation that purportedly supplemented Berne and was
in an ideal position to address authors' digital issues does not provide
much assistance.
2. The EU Copyright Directive
The intention of the EU Copyright Directive 2 17 is two-fold: (1) to
implement the WIPO "Internet Treaties" and, (2) to harmonize certain
aspects of substantive copyright law.21 8 It has been suggested that the
EU has worked with WIPO to make WIPO's copyright agenda reflect
that of the EU.219 In this light, it is not surprising that the Directive
does not offer significant ameliorations to the WCT. Some argue that
authors' heightened need for protection in the digital world cloaks the
underlying need to protect right holders all at the expense of users of
such works. 22 0  Similar to the WCT, the Directive leaves the most
important copyright problems of the digital environment unresolved.
According to Bernt Hugenholtz, the Directive "does not do much for
authors at all.",22 1 It is mainly geared to the "main players" in the
information industry and not to the creators. Significantly, the
Directive fails to protect authors against publishers imposing standard
form "all rights" buy-out contracts; rather, Recital 30 and Article 9
emphasize that the Directive does not affect the law of
215. Industry Canada, supra note 203.
216. Vaver, supra note 205. "The International Court of Justice was supposed to
adjudicate disputes, but in practice it never has-mainly because of the cumbersome nature of
proceedings and because of practical difficulties in enforcing its orders." Id.
217. Council Directive 0 1/29 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and
Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (hereafter "the Directive").
218. This will set the stage for joint ratification by the Member States and the EU, which
must be implemented by December 22, 2002; see B. Hugenholtz Why the Copyright Directive is
Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, 22(11) EIPR 2000 499.
219. David Vaver, Copyright in the Digital Age: The Recent European Directive, THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (2002).
220. Mark Wing & Ewan Kirk, European/US Copyright Law Reform: Is a Balance Being
Achieved, 2 I.P.Q. 139 (2000).
221. B. Hugenholtz, supra note 218, at 501.
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22
contract. 22Article 9 also indicates the Directive's failure to address
the interface between contract and copyright exemptions, an issue at
the fore of freelancers' digital rights.223 Moreover, relating to rights
management provisions instituted by the WCT, "the Directive
assumes that right holders will always employ rights management
systems for legitimate purposes. 2 24  Still, these systems may be
deployed in ways that do not comply with EU privacy laws or to track
distributors who lawfully use material that right holders aim to
dissuade. Again, how the Directive advances authors' rights is not
entirely clear.
3. Conclusions
I have shown how legislation on an international and continental
level does very little to advance authors and original entitlements.
Rather, these initiatives proceed from bad to worse in their focus on
facilitating and protecting business exploitation. Berne, which was
triumphed as the author's statute, merely paid lip service to such
rights. TRIPS, perhaps most skewed to advancing corporate interests,
shuns any recognition of moral rights and parades a host of aggressive
remedies to help right holders. The WCT is no improvement. Meant
to usher copyright in the digital age, it does so solely for industry by
way of encryption and watermarking technology provisions. The
Directive is again geared to the main actors in the information
industry, such as publishers, and thus explicitly denounces contract
regulation-which remains a pressing issue for freelancers.
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FREELANCE WORK IN NORTH AMERICA
Across the western world, freelance authors of articles
previously published in newspapers have launched copyright
infringement actions against publishers and owners of electronic
databases after their articles were made available online. The case
that has received the most publicity and invited the most commentary
is the US decision, Tasini v New York Times Co. 225 As Sidney
Rosenzweig argues, while both freelancer and publisher sides have
diametrically opposed views on the dispute, both agree on one point:
"this issue will have wide ranging consequences for the publishing
industry no matter which side prevails."
226
222. Id.
223. Id. at 501.
224. E.g., to track the source of potentially infringing copies; see Vaver, supra note 205.
225. NY Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
226. Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 908 (citing Rosalind Resnick, Writers, Data Bases Do
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A. The US: The Tasini Case
In Tasini, six freelance writers launched an action against three
print publishers: New York Times Company, Newsday, Inc. and
Time, Inc. The dispute centered on twenty-one articles written by the
freelancers between 1990 and 1993, in which they had registered
copyrights. The petitioner publishers registered collective works
copyrights in each edition in which the articles originally appeared.
The publishers engaged the authors as independent contractors under
contracts that "in no instance secured consent from an Author to
placement of an Article in an electronic database. 22 7 However, the
publishers, under separate licensing agreements with database and
CD-ROM companies, (LexisNexis and University Microfilms
International respectively), and without the consent of their
freelancers, permitted copies of the freelancers' articles to appear in
electronic media. Granted a writ of certiorari to the US Supreme
Court, the respondent publishers contested a Second Circuit ruling
that had reversed a District Court decision stating that the publishers
had infringed the freelancers' copyright in their individual works.
At issue was whether the reproduced articles were collective
works and specifically, "revisions" of the original newspaper in which
the articles first appeared. Justice Ginsburg speaking for the majority
held that § 201 (c) of the US Copyright Act of 1976228 on the privilege
of reproduction and distribution of collective works, did not authorize
the copying at issue.229 The publishers were "not sheltered by §
201(c) because the databases reproduce and distribute articles
standing alone and not in context.,
230
1. The Publisher's Privilege under Section 201(c)
The Supreme Court's analysis focused on the interpretation of §
201 (c) of the USCA which reads:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective
work in the same series.
231
Battle, I NEW L. J. 28 (1998)).
227. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 484.
228. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C § 101 et seq.
229. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487.
230. Id.
231. Id. (emphasis added).
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According to the Court, § 201(c) both describes and
circumscribes the "privilege" that a publisher acquires when an author
contributes to a collective work. 32  Absent a contract stating
otherwise, a publisher is privileged to reproduce or distribute a
freelancer's contributed article, only "as part of' any (or all) of the
three enumerated categories of collective works. However, "a
publisher could not revise the contribution itself or include it in a new
anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective
work., 23 3  The court ruled that the reproduced works were not
"revisions" but that the publishers indirectly achieved the result of
"selling" a copy of the articles to the public by "providing multitudes
of 'individually retrievable' articles., 234  To rule otherwise would
"diminish" the authors' "exclusive rights" in the articles.
235
Importantly, both the majority and dissent failed to consider whether
the § 201 (c) privilege was transferable.236
The majority adopted a purposeful reading of the legislation by
analyzing the legal meaning of § 201(c) in light of its history. While
copyright in the initial contribution vests in the author, copyright in
the collective work vests in the collective author or newspaper
company, extending only to its contributed creative material and not
to the "pre-existing material employed in the work., 237 The Court
explained that prior to the 1976 revision of the USCA, authors risked
losing their rights when they placed an article in a collective work,
since "publishers, exercising their superior bargaining power over
authors, declined to print notices in each contributor's name . .. ,,238
The Court stated that Congress sought to "clarify and improve [this]
confused and frequently unfair legal situation with respect to the
rights in contributions., 239 As such, the Court suggests that Congress
aimed to remedy the historical author-publisher imbalance.
Justice Stevens's dissent also considered the history of § 201(c)
but held that the publishers possessed the privilege to reprint the
subject works since: (1) such a finding did not affect the copyright of
the freelancers' individual contributions as the publishers neither
232. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 496.
233. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976)); S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5659, 5738 (1976).
234. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 492.
235. Id. at 498.
236. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511, n. 6.
237. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
238. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 495.
239. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 122 (1976), U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5659, 5738 (1976).
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modified the articles nor published them in a "new anthology or an
entirely different magazine or other collective work, ' 240 and (2) the
history of the provision was meant to preserve authors' rights in a
contribution, and did not justify that such an objective could only be
honored by a pro-freelancer finding.
241
As a result, the majority's ruling appears to be pro-freelancer,
while the dissent's, pro-publisher. Based on the Court's division, the
next section analyzes three opposing arguments underpinning the
freelancer-publisher debate. The Court's focus is mainly on the
nature of digital reproduction.
2. Tasini Reasoning
(a.) Argument 1: Print to Electronic Media
Both the majority and minority disagree on how to define the
revised electronic nature of the freelancers' print articles for the
purpose of § 201(C). 242  The dissent claims that the correct focus
should be on how the articles are stored and made available to the
databases, whereas the majority emphasizes the users' perception of
the articles that are stored and made available to the public.
243
According to the majority, when the user conducts the required search
to find a given article, each article appears as a separate item within
the search result-without the graphic, formatting or other articles
with which the article was initially published.244 Conversely, for the
dissent, the electronic versions of the articles are part of a collection
of text files of a particular edition of the newspaper, and appear online
cross-referenced to that edition.
Yet the majority and the dissent lack a sophisticated
understanding of the implications of revising freelancers' articles
from print to electronic media. While the electronic articles may have
references to the complete collection of that day's print edition of the
New York Times, the original elements that distinguish a newspaper
and qualify it as a revision of a collective work are not necessarily
preserved. Both judgments ignore that the newspaper's opinion
section and the editorial content of that day's edition (which as the
240. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511.
241. Id.
242. Id. While the dissent found that these articles were part of a collection of articles from
a single edition of the NY Times, and thus a simple "revision," the majority found that they
constituted individual works, and were not part of a collection. Id.
243. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 498.
244. Id. at 517.
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dissent points out is the most important creative element the collective
author can contribute) 245 do not accompany the individual article.
And so, the most important creative contribution of the newspaper
can only be accessed with a specific search, or not at all. Therefore
this lack of contribution can be an additional ground as to why the
publishers contravened the freelancers' copyright. Moreover,
additional creative elements, like editorials and advertisements,246
distinguish the publication's ideologies 247 often projecting a certain
political perspective perceived by its readers and ultimately its
contributors. As a result, the presence of these elements or perhaps
the existence of others,248 may instill in authors a fear of being tainted
and likely being less credible as they become associated with online
foray with which they desire no alliance.
(b.) Argument 2: Media Neutrality
The majority of the Court challenges the dissent's endorsement
of the publishers' media neutrality argument. Media neutrality is the
notion that the transfer of a work between media does not change the
character of that work for copyright purposes. 249 For the dissent, the
concept of media-neutrality is preserved since the publishers' decision
to convert a single edition of a newspaper, or a collective work, into a
collection of individual files can be explained "as little more than a
decision that reflects the different nature of the electronic medium., 250
Just as the New York Times has the right to reprint issues in Braille,
in a foreign language, or in microform (even though such versions
may look and feel quite different than the original), it has the right to
reproduce these electronically. 25'
Still, analogizing new digital uses to past publishers' practices is
somewhat far-reaching. These freelancers were paid additional fees
for different uses, while the works were not exposed to the volatility
of the digital world where there is greater potential for alteration or
infringement by third parties. 2  Additionally, the current form of the
245. Id. at515
246. Michael Spink, Authors Stripped of their Electronic Rights in Tasini v. New York
Times Co., 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 432. (1999).
247. For instance, newspapers may be known to showcase certain political parties either
through their editorials or advertising.
248. Tasteless advertising for instance on a Web site containing an author's work.
249. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502.
250. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 512-13.
251. Id.
252. Arnold Vahrenwald, The Publishing Industry Faces Technological Change, 7 ENT.
L. REV. 50,50 (1996).
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databases is not completely attributable to the nature of the electronic
media, but more to the nature of the economic market served by the
databases. The publishers' and dissent's analogy in likening the long
standing practice of freelancers tacitly consenting to microfilm
versions of periodicals to the natural technological evolution of
electronic storage is erroneous. Besides the noted differences in
medium,253 microfilm does not yield the profits that digitized articles
do.254 Irene Ayers comments that while freelancers receive no further
compensation for their works, hard copy publishers sell these works
to electronic publishers for large sums of money, which in turn make
greater profits from user fees. 5 In between the lines is the idea that
formats must be digitized and archived to provide quick and easy
access to users who pay for such services. As a result, it is not so
easy to endorse the publishers' argument that freelancers have
implicitly waived their rights since they did not object to microfiche
reproduction. Hugenholtz puts it best: "[i]n a multimedia
environment analogies are dangerous animals." 256  Equating hard-
copies or microfilm to CD-ROM or electronic mechanisms, suggests
that there is "very little understanding of the ongoing media
revolution.
'
"
2 57
(c.) Argument 3: Policy Considerations
The dissent argues from a utilitarian perspective that copyright is
"a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers. 25 8
The tax restricts the dissemination of works, but only insofar as
necessary to encourage their production. Put differently, "the primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the author, but to secure the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. 2 59
Rather than narrowly focusing on authors' rights as per the majority,
the dissent purports to favor the public of users in order to promote
the "broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts. For Justice Stevens, publishers will have difficulties in
locating individual freelancers and the potential for statutory damages
253. For instance, unlike the digital version, the microfilm article appears in context;
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 517.
254. Ayers, supra note 15.
255. Id.
256. P. Bert Hugenholtz, Electronic Rights and Wrongs in Germany and the Netherlands,
22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 151, 158 (1998).
257. Id.
258. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 519.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 520 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975)).
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will likely force electronic archives to purge works from their
databases. 261 As publishers and many commentators also argue, this
effect would eliminate a section of world history by outlawing all
digitally archived copies of freelancers' works.262
While it is laudable that the dissent specifically uses policy
reasons for resolving ambiguities in the USCA, the majority points
out the shortcomings of this perspective. The majority observes:
"speculation about future harms is no basis for the Court to shrink
authorial rights Congress established in section 201 (c)., 263 The Court
acknowledges that the parties "may enter into an agreement allowing
continued electronic reproduction of the [a]uthor's works. 2 64
Furthermore, although it may be sensible to allocate the right of
distribution to publishers since they can best handle the task from an
efficiency perspective, as the appellate court also pointed out,265 a
court "is not free to construe statutes in the manner most efficient[;]
[i]nstead, the court must follow the intent of Congress as expressed in
the term of the statute., 266 As Josh May indicates, authors may still
retain control of electronic distribution of their works through
collective rights organizations, for instance.267 While commercial
copyright transactions can be prohibitively expensive for individuals,
this is not so for collective groups. 268 Indeed, "if necessary the courts
and Congress may draw on numerous models for distributing
copyrighted works and remunerating authors for their distribution. 269
To this effect, the dissent does acknowledge that government is more
equipped to study the nature and scope of the problem and devise an
appropriate licensing remedy.27°
Should these digital issues remain in the judicial arena, in light
of the majority's decision based on the imbalance between freelancer
and publisher, it is arguable that future freelancers' disputes will be
resolved in their favor. However, it remains worrisome that Tasini
261. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520.
262. See Elder, supra note 69.
263. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505-06.
264. Id. at 505.
265. Tasini v New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2d. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Tasini
Apps]; Tasini v New York Times Co., 184 F.2d 350 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (also adopting a
utilitarian perspective).
266. Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F.2d 1146, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (relied on Tasini v. New
York Times Co).
267. Josh May, Intellectual Property: Copyright Acquisition and Ownership Tasini v New
York Times Co., 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 26 (2001).
268. Id.
269. Tasini, 206 F.3d 161 at 505.
270. Id. at 520 n. 18.
2002]
76 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19
does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the current digital
conundrum authors face and thus may reinforce a myopic
understanding of the issues.
3. Tasini and the Conveyance of Copyright Conundrum
While Tasini is arguably a triumphant ruling for authors and
does highlight the current digital issues plaguing freelancers vis-A-vis
publishers, the case falls short of properly addressing the copyright
management problems that first underpinned the relationship between
the parties. By the time the case made its way to the Supreme Court,
the contractual claims, which were argued at the District 271 and
Appeals 272 courts, were no longer an issue. While all the writers who
submitted their articles for publication to New York Times did not
have any written agreements, at the District Court Newsday and Time
contended that their freelancers had "expressly transferred" the
electronic rights in their articles2 73 and thus were not limited to those
privileges set out in § 201(c). Newsday unsuccessfully relied upon
check legends authorizing it to include the plaintiffs' articles "in
electronic library archives. 2 74  Time, on the other hand,
unsuccessfully relied upon the "first right to publish" secured in its
written contract with one of the plaintiffs.
Since written contracts have rarely existed in the freelancer-
publisher relationship, it is insightful to briefly examine one of the
Tasini plaintiffs written agreements with Time. Time's argument
was based on section 10(a) of its written agreement with the plaintiff
27' 276Whitford.275  Relying on a motion picture decision, Time argued
271. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (ruling for
summary judgment in favor of the defendant publishers); Tasini v. New York Times Co., 981 F.
Supp. 841 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (denying authors' motion for reconsideration).
272. Tasini, 206 F.3d 161 (reversing judgment and ruling in favor of freelancers).
273. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809.
274. Id. at 807 (considered 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) stating that any valid transfer of copyright
must be in writing).
275. Whitford and Sports Illustrated (owned by Time) entered into a written contract
specifying the content and length of the purchased article, the date due, and the fee to be paid by
the magazine ("Whitford Contract"). The contract also provided Sports Illustrated the following
rights:
(a) the exclusive right first to publish the Story in the Magazine;
(b) the non-exclusive right to license the republication of the Story whether in
translation, digest, or abridgement form or otherwise in other publications,
provided that the Magazine shall pay to you fifty percent (50%) of all net
proceeds it receives for such republication; and
(c) the right to republish the Story or any portions thereof in or in connection
with the Magazine or in other publications published by The Time Inc. Magazine
Company, its parent, subsidiaries or affiliates, provided that you shall be paid the
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that this language included no "media-based limitation" and
consequently, its first publication rights must be interpreted to extend
to NEXIS.277 While the District Court ruled in Time's favor (but was
reversed on appeal), in obiter the court wondered why Time did not
enforce its rights pursuant to clauses (b) and (c) of the Whitford
Contract in order to both validate its electronic rights and defend itself
against the infringement allegation.278 On appeal, the court answered
the question: Time's enforcement would have meant that it abide by
its license and compensate Whitford for new uses of his works. As
the Appeals Court intuited, "Time took this position, of course,
because it did not compensate Whitford pursuant to the agreement
and could not, therefore, convincingly invoke the conditional license
granted in paragraphs (b) and (c) thereof.',279 This outcome suggests
that publishers like Time will enforce existing contracts at their
convenience and ultimately expect digital uses of freelancers' works
outright.
4. Conclusions
The Supreme Court summed up the copyright transfer issue in a
footnote, since neither of the publishers pressed the claim.280
Apparently, the publishers could not win, or as seen in Whitford's
case, did not wish to win by enforcing payment terms in the Whitford
Contract. Instead, they relied on the privilege conferred by § 201(c)
in the alternative. It is arguable that publishers will rely on existing
contractual language only to their advantage, such that they may not
respect comprehensive electronic rights clauses if these mean that
they will owe freelancers monetary consideration for honoring their
bargains. Or as seen with the endorsed checks, publishers will
manipulate any semblance to an agreement to prove freelancers'
consent in contracting with them for electronic rights. To this end,
against the expansive reading of the District Court, both the Appeals
and Supreme Court decisions were sensible in construing a narrow
then prevailing rates of the publication in which the Story is republished.
Id.
276. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1968),
(holding that the right to 'exhibit' motion picture included the right to exhibit movie on
television), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826, (1968).
277. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp 804, 811 (S.D. N.Y. 1997).
278. Recall that Time alleged only 'first publication' rights pursuant to Whitford Contract
clause (a).
279. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 171.
280. Newsday waived its defense; Time's argument was rejected on its merits. Tasini, 533
US at 489.
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reading of § 201(c). Doing otherwise would have indirectly ascribed
transfer of ownership rights from freelancers to publishers. This
result would have been hideously at odds with authors' exclusive
rights. It is sensible that when courts are in doubt they should
construe publishers' rights narrowly in relation to those of its
freelancers. 281 Tasini's contractual analysis indicates that agreements
purporting to transfer electronic rights must be clear, utilizing plain
language to identify each transferred right.282 However, it remains
insufficient to leave such decisions at the behest of courts since as we
have seen in the dissent and majority opinions, judges differ widely as
they attempt to read in government intent or interpret contractual
clauses. As Rod Dixon observes on reading future technology
clauses, "the outcome will depend on how narrow or broad a reading
is given to the actual words of the grant. 283  The challenge is
therefore to what extent laws and contracts should be drafted to
account for both commercial certainty and judicial flexibility.
While Tasini exposed a variety of issues underpinning the
freelancer-publisher relationship, it did not come without its
oversights. Tasini did not account for contractual imbalances, or for
the ideological and political dimensions obscured by digital
reproduction. One wonders why the freelancers did not also advance
moral rights violations since, inter alia, issues of accurate attribution
of their works were in question. On a more fundamental level,
Wendy Gordon questions Tasini's interpretation of § 201(c) because
"[r]egardless of whether the making of a digital collection infringes a
freelancer's right of reproduction, the publisher and his database
licensee clearly infringe the right of distribution when they make the
article available for individual downloads. 284  Accordingly,
infringement can still occur because freelancers not only have a
reproduction right, but also an exclusive right of distribution, which is
a separately recognizable right.285 Yet given that the inquiry did not
completely capitalize on delineating authors' rights, Gordon's judicial
oversight is not surprising. In light of these shortcomings, it is
questionable to deem freelancers as the triumphant party in Tasini as
286
many commentators have done.
281. See May, supra note 265, at 25.
282. Santelli, supra note 14, at 277.
283. Rod Dixon, Profits in Cyberspace: Should Newspaper and Magazine Publishers Pay
Freelance Writers for Digital Content? 4 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 127, 138 (1998)
available at http://www.mttir.org/volfour/dixon.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2002).
284. Gordon, supra note 17 (emphasis added).
285. Id.
286. See generally Yuri Hur, Tasini v. New York Times: Ownership of Electronic
COPYRIGHT TREA TMENT OF FREELANCE WORK
5. Tasini Aftermath
After the Supreme Court decision, New York Times adopted a
policy to accept only freelance works for which authors expressly
surrendered all of their copyright. The publishing house also posted a
notice on its Web site stating that any freelancers' work affected by
Tasini would be removed from the electronic databases unless the
writer executed a release of all claims arising out of New York
Times' infringement in connection with that work.287 In the near
future, New York Times intends to remove each of the approximately
115,000 affected articles.288 Pursuant to this "Hobson's choice," the
newspaper company forces freelancers to choose between two
options: (1) whether to press for compensation, or (2) forego
compensation in favor of keeping their articles in the electronic
databases at a time when these writers have limited information, since
the damage awards from the Supreme Court decision have not yet
been determined. 289 The subtext is that if freelancers choose the first
option their articles will be purged from the databases and, more
significantly, appear as the recalcitrant authors hard-pressed to secure
future contracts with the big publishers. Hence, while the author-
publisher imbalance, on a symbolic level, appears to be equalized in
Tasini by adopting a purposive reading of § 201(c) of the USCA, the
aftermath may dull any justice for freelancers. Rather than working
out compensation schemes, New York Times, as the dominant party,
executes retributive payment schemes. As several commentators
have concluded, future freelancers will be unable to retain their
electronic rights due to the "lopsided power dynamic between authors
and publishers., 290 Ultimately, in Yuri Hur's words, what the Tasini
line of decisions highlight is the "continuing struggle between
freelance writers and publishers over compensation for the electronic
publication of copyrighted material. 291
B. Canada: The Robertson Case
Robertson v. Thomson Corp292 is Canada's version of Tasini.
Copyrights Rightfully Returned to Authors, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 65 (2000).
287. Tasini has recently challenged the New York Times regarding a release agreement
asking freelance writers to release their compensation claims. New York Times has also
notified freelancers about the release agreement through ads in its daily newspaper. Tasini, 184
F. Supp. 2d 350, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
288. Id.
289. Tasini, 184 F.2d at 350.
290. Dixon, supra note 283, at 150.
291. Hur, supra note 286, at 67.
292. Robertson v. Thomson Corp., No. 96-CU-1 10595, 2001 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 22426
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However, unlike Tasini, where there were individual joined plaintiffs,
in Robertson, Heather Robertson headed a class of plaintiffs.
293
Robertson is a well-known Canadian writer who contributed two
individual works in the newsprint edition of Globe and Mail
("Globe"). These works were subsequently retained electronically
and made available to the public for a fee via various electronic
media, including CD-ROM and Internet databases.294 Similar to the
publishing giants in Tasini, Thomson Corporation is a large
multimedia company in the business of publishing newspapers like
Globe, with various subsidiaries.
In contrast to Tasini, where there were no written agreements
save for the plaintiff Whitford's, in Robertson, Globe entered into a
letter agreement with Robertson's publisher McClelland & Stewart in
August 1995 for one-time usage of one of her works for a fee, which
made no reference to electronic rights. Beginning in February 1996,
Globe entered into a written contract with numerous freelancers,
which it revised in December 1996 in order to expand the electronic
rights clause, which read: ". . .for perpetual inclusion in the internal
and commercially available databases and other storage media
(electronic and otherwise) of Globe or its assignees and products
(electronic and otherwise) derived therefrom." 295
Like Tasini, Robertson is a copyright infringement case dealing
with the issues of: (1) whether electronic reproduction violates the
individual copyright of the owner or whether such reproduction falls
within the copyright of the collective author and, in the alternative,
(2) although Globe may have infringed the plaintiffs copyright,
whether it may nevertheless be within its rights by an implied license
or implied term in its contract. 296 Since the copyright infringement
claim essentially adopts the analysis employed in Tasini, the
comments here are mostly limited to the licensing issues. While the
Ontario court also found copyright infringement, as the reproductions
constituted copies of the freelancers' individual works in which
Robertson alone had copyright, the licensing issues were problematic.
(Oct. 3, 2001).
293. According to the Statement of Claim, the class has been defined as, "anyone who
created literary or artistic work published in Canada in the print media and which has been
reproduced through computer databases since April 24, 1979 (the date InfoGlobe was
launched)." See C. Down, Suing Thomson: It's a Classic David and Goliath Story, 5(4) MEDIA
14-5 (1999).
294. Robertsn, 2001 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 22426, at *2.
295. Id. at *22.
296. Id. See also Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (against Robertson, Tasini argued the statutory
action of copyright infringement in the alternative).
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Based on the complexity of the licensing facts, the court found a
genuine issue for trial and could not grant Robertson summary
judgment.
1. Transfer of Copyright by Implied Terms and Implied
License
While the court did not ultimately rule on the conveyance of
copyright, it nonetheless found it important to spend some time
articulating its stance on the issue. Section 13(4) of the Canadian
Copyright Act (CCA)297 is accepted to apply to assignments and
proprietary licenses, and states that these can be made in whole or in
part and must be in writing.298 It is clear that a mere license, which
does not grant an interest in the copyright, need not be in writing.299
In Robertson, Globe alleged that it had a license, either through
implied terms in the contract or through an implied license.300 Globe
claimed that it was entitled to a "continuing right in perpetuity to
reproduce the plaintiffs freelance articles throughout the world
through electronic on-line databases via the Internet., 30 1 In response,
the plaintiff freelancer argued that such a grant connoted "an
assignment or license in the nature of the grant of a proprietary
interest in the freelancer's copyright. 30 2  As a result, the plaintiff
freelancer contended that the defendant must comply with § 13(4) of
the CCA in order for the license to be valid. Nonetheless, the court
ruled that the license did not need to be in writing because it did not
convey a proprietary interest. Globe's license was "arguably
nonexclusive" since the freelancer "retains the rights to publish and
re-sell the individual work.
3 0 3
While the court cannot confer a proprietary interest in the
copyright as the defendant would like, the court conversely leaves
open the question of whether there was in fact a license between the
parties and more specifically of what type. The decision, for instance,
does not preclude the possibility that the defendant could be entitled
297. Copyright Act RSC cl. C-42 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter CCA].
298. CCA § 13(4)(7) (on assignments and proprietary licenses, respectively); CCA § 13(4)
(also applies to proprietary licenses, but not to nonexclusive or implied licenses); JOHN S.
MCKEOWN, FOX CANADIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGN (3d
ed., Carswell Scarborough 2000).
299. Id. at 388.
300. The Globe's alternative defenses were of consent, acquiescence, the applicable
limitation period, and latches. Robertson, 2001 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 22426, at *4.
301. Id. at *71.
302. Id. (emphasis added).
303. Id. at *72.
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to a license in the new electronic uses of the works. Conflicting
evidence regarding the license could not allow the court to make a
ruling and consequently, the court conveniently side-stepped a final
decision.
Moreover, the court found considerable evidence regarding
Globe's new electronic publishing practices. The court noted that the
freelancers were aware of the existence of the database,
InfoGlobeOnline, which featured online versions of freelance articles
long before 1996.304 The court thus suggests that in 1996 Globe
merely codified the existing practice of electronically publishing
freelancers' works in its new standard contract. Hence, the court
speculates that if the freelancers wanted to restrict their rights, they
were obliged to do so expressly. 30 5 But again given the nature of the
conflicting evidence (as the freelancers testified to only granting one-
time print rights), the court did not make a determinative ruling.
2. Conclusions
Justice Cumming suggested that given the complexity,
uncertainty, and importance of the copyright issue in Robertson,
Globe could have contracted expressly with freelancers from the very
inception of its electronic database in 1977.306 This oversight was
peculiar given Globe's practice to only accept freelance articles that
could be distributed electronically, 30 7 and that as a media giant, it was
in the best position to contract for electronic rights. It is therefore
ironic that Globe used its customs and practices to validate its
electronic business activity but would overlook the practice of
properly codifying this new custom. Gordon challenges publishers'
reliance on custom. She asserts that the "so-called custom is
unilateral"30 8 and does not logically result in payment to freelancers or
acknowledgement that they lack any input in establishing the custom.
Globe simply may have assumed that it was entitled to all future uses
of its freelancers' printed works. This possible patronistic stance is
not unusual given that the same was likely assumed in Tasini and
given the imbalanced history of publishers and authors.
While Robertson and Tasini did not squarely address the
304. Id. at *78.
305. "A freelancer who knows the uses to be made of a work and expresses no limitations
can arguably be said to impliedly license the publisher to make use of the work within those
contemplated uses." Id. at *69.
306. Robertson, 2001 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 22426, at *75.
307. Id. at*ll.
308. Gordon, supra note 17, at 495.
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publisher-author contractual imbalance, both courts alluded to it.
Justice Cumming found it unusual for Globe not to have contracted
for its purported rights by arguing for a mere implied license while
also desiring a proprietary interest. And in Tasini, Time was found
not to have enforced its written electronic rights provisions. As seen
in Tasini, publishing giants expect freelancers' works outright since
they will either, (1) not contract for these expressly as required by
law, or, (2) if these are contracted for, avoid enforcement to the extent
compensating freelancers is necessary. On appeal, Robertson is
expected to make a determinative ruling on the implied license issue
alongside the defences of latches and acquiescence. 30 9  Lastly,
Robertson like Tasini, did not consider freelancers' moral rights, nor
any ideological or political implications associated with the new uses
of freelancers' works and, consequently, yet again obscured the
various facets of the author-publisher digital dilemma.
VI. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FREELANCE WORK IN CONTINENTAL
EUROPE
Across continental Europe, freelancer case law showcases
similar arguments as seen in North American jurisprudence.
Publishers claim copyrights in new electronic uses pursuant to
implied agreements, while freelancers contend that they merely
contract for one-time print rights and never intended or consented to
grant rights for new modes of exploitation. In all these cases,
agreements are oral and terms on new use rights are vague, if not
absent. Importantly, however, various unifying interpretative tools
can be gleaned.
A. Judicial Interpretation Principles
Distinct from Tasini and Robertson, express national legislation
eases judicial interpretation across continental Europe. In Canada and
the US, I illustrated how courts struggled in applying vague copyright
law provisions, and vainly focused on copyright infringement issues
by examining differences between print and digital versions of
freelance work. Yet, while continental European countries feature
more progressive and express legislation, and render more favorable
freelance rulings, some national provisions such as the foreseeability
principle are still disadvantageous to freelancers.
309. Wendy Matheson, Robertson Defense Counsel, Phone Interview (July 18, 2002)
(noting that appellate hearing date is yet to be announced).
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1. Foreseeability Principle
Foreseeability of technology is a predominant judicial
interpretive tool codified in national laws. Pursuant to French law,
310
the reproduction of writers' works in a new publication requires their
express authorization. This permission can only be conveyed if at the
time of contracting the technology was foreseeable, the contract
expressly covered the new modes of exploitation, and there was a
royalty provision for authors in the event of a new exploitation. 31' In
Union of French Journalists and National Syndicate of Journalists v.
SDV Plurimdia3 12 several French journalists and their trade unions
directly launched a suit not against their publisher, but against a third
party, the online service provider, Plurim~dia. At issue was the online
dissemination of articles licensed by Dernikres Nouvelles d'Alsace
31 3
to Plurim6dia. Favoring the authors, the court ruled that the collective
agreement was concluded in 1983 when online technology was
unforeseeable.
In the Netherlands, the Netherlands Association of Journalists
filed a suit against one of the largest Dutch newspapers, De
Volkskrant, also relying on the codified foreseeability principle.3 14
Article 2(2) of the Dutch Copyright Act (DCA)3 15 limits the scope of
the transfer to rights specifically enumerated or necessarily implied
by the nature or purpose of the agreement. The impr~vision rule of
Article 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code allows for "dissolution of a
contract if unforeseen circumstances no longer justify the contract to
continue under its original terms." 316  The Association had been
unsuccessfully negotiating with various publishers over additional
remuneration for the electronic reuse of journalistic works. 3 17  De
Volkskrant had been reusing the plaintiffs' contributions on its Web
310. Code de Proprit6 Intellectuelle, Art. L 131-6 (Fr.) [hereinafter CPI].
311. Id.
312. Union of French Journalists v. SDV Plurimedia, Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Strasbourg, Ordonnance de Refere Commercial, (1998), translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 177, 199 (1998) [hereinafter Plurim~dia]. While the case exclusively concerned
employed writers, and applied both intellectual property and labour law it is still worth noting
that as found with the journalists, the court would have also held the freelancers to have granted
only limited rights to first publication pursuant to the CPI on the basis of foreseeability.
313. News items from programmes broadcast by channel FR3 were also at issue.
314. Heg, Mulder & Starn v. De Volkskrant, No D 3 (Amsterdam Dist. Ct. 3d 1997),
translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 181-89 (1998).
315. Copyright Act of September 23, 1912, Staatsblad 308 (1973), 9 Copyright 181
[hereinafer DCA].
316. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Electronic Rights and Wrongs in Germany and the Netherlands,
22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 151, 157 (1998).
317. Id. at 155.
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site and CD-ROM. The Amsterdam District Court held for the
plaintiffs, finding copyright and moral rights infringement 318 because
CD-ROMs and Web sites constituted independent means of
communication. The court also tacitly invoked Article 2(2) of the
DCA because in the 1980s, when the licenses were granted, the
plaintiffs could not have foreseen that their contributions would be
included in electronic media.3 19
But the foreseeability factor does not always favor freelancers. In
Germany the main source of copyright law is the German Copyright
Act (GCA).3 20 The Publishing Act of 1901,321 featuring specific rules
on publishing agreements, supplements the GCA. Transfers, whether
in writing, oral or implicit, are impossible-only exclusive or non-
exclusive licenses are allowed.322 Article 31(4) of the GCA declares
void any obligation relating to uses that were unknown at the time the
license was granted. Under this rule, the moment of the party's
knowledge of a new use is vital to determining the scope of the
license.32 3 In a decision before the Regional Court of Hamburg,324
Freelens, an association of about 70 freelance news photographers,
sued the magazine Der Spiegel for copyright and moral rights
infringement. 325 Between 1989 and 1993, the freelancers had sold
photographs to Der Spiegel, which were available on CD-ROM since
1993. Der Spiegel alleged that since CD-ROMs were a well-known
use in 1989, when the original print licenses were granted, the
photographers had implicitly licensed this form of use. At the trial
level, the Hamburg Court held for the publisher326 because when the
licences were granted (in 1989 or later) CD-ROM was a known use
despite the lack of market success at the time. Therefore, the
318. The DCA expressly allows for the transfer of copyright in writing, either in full or in
part, and irrespective of a complete transfer, authors retain moral rights pursuant to its droit
d'auteur tradition; DCA, supra note 315, at art. 2, 25.
319. Volkskrant, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 181-89.
320. German Copyright Act of September 9, 1965 [Urheberrechtsgesetz],
Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1273, No. 51 (September 16, 1965), translated in 1 COPYRIGHT 251
(1965) [hereinafter GCAJ.
321. German Publishing Act of 1901 [Verlasgezetz], translated in, UNESCO Copyright
Laws and Treaties of the World, Germany Item 3 (1975).
322. Hugenholtz, supra note 316, at 152.
323. P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Annemique de Kroon, The Electronic Rights War, 6 INT'L
INTELL. PROP. L. & POL'Y 88-1 (2000).
324. Freelens v. Der Spiegel, 308 0. 284/96 (Reg. Ct of Hamburg 1997), translated in 22
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 178 (1998).
325. Hugenholtz, supra note 316, at 151.
326. The court did not determine whether re-use on CD-ROM constituted a new
independent use for the purposes of article 31(4) of the GCA; see Freelens, 308 0. 284/96, at
179.
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photographers could not invoke Article 31(4) of the GCA. The court
reasoned that: (1) the photographers had never previously objected to
republication of their works in microfilm, and (2) the digital medium
was, as publishers have argued elsewhere, a mere substitute for
microfilm or print.
2. Purpose-of-Grant Rule
While the German court in Freelens relied more heavily on the
foreseeabililty rule, the court still noted the "purpose-of-grant" rule as
a second "author-friendly" provision. 327 Essentially, whenever the
contract terms do not specifically identify the uses for which rights
are granted, the author is deemed to have granted no more rights than
are required by the purpose of the contract. Moreover, as adopted
relating to the foreseeability of technology principle, Article 2(2) of
the DCA limits the scope of the transfer to rights specifically
enumerated or implied by the agreement's purpose. 328 According to
Hugenholtz, the Dutch courts have by analogy applied this transfer
rule to licenses.329 Consequently, licenses are strictly interpreted, and
in the case of freelancers often mean solely non-exclusive, one-time
print rights.
330
3. Pro-Author Interpretation
Some European courts have adopted legislation that expressly
favors the author. Section 3(1) of the Belgian Copyright Act (BCA) 3 1
regulates the transfer of economic rights and mandates a written
transfer contract. Importantly, it provides that both the scope of the
grant and the means of exploitation need to be identified and
interpreted narrowly in favor of the author. In General Association of
Professional Journalists v. Central Station,332  freelancers and
employed journalists represented by the Belgian Union of Journalists
won against ten publishers that had founded a consortium, Central
327. Hugenholtz & Kroon, supra note 323, at 7.
328. "Do print licenses imply a right of electronic re-use?" is the question. Hugenholtz,
supra note 316, at 157.
329. It is unclear as to whether the purpose-of-grant rule prevalent in Germany has
effectively been codified in the DCA. Irrespective, it is clear that article 2(2) of the DCA
warrants a restrictive interpretation on copyright transfers. Id.
330. But unlike Belgium and Germany, the Netherlands has no special provision on
publishing agreements or copyright contracts in general. To this end, the DCA does not contain
the equivalent of the 'revision' rule seen in Tasini.
331. Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights of 1994 [Loi relative au droit d'auteur et
aux droits voisins], MONITEUR BELGE 27 (1994) (Belg.) [hereinafter BCA].
332. Association Generale des Journalistes Professionnels de Belgique v. SCRL
Central Station, 1998 E.C.C. 40 (Oct. 16, 1996).
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Station. Since 1996, Central Station operated a Web site containing a
cross-section of various articles for fee-paying users to access. "'
The Brussels Court held that the publishers needed the freelancers'
written consent pursuant to section 3(1) of the BCA.
B. Other Unifying Principles
1. Nature of Electronic Media
As in North America, European courts are also mindful of
general digital reproduction issues. In Central Station, the court
stated that reproduced articles are "destined for the specific public of
a particular periodical, not for the largest possible public that might be
interested., 334 The appellate court recognized one of the silences with
respect to authors' undermined position in the digital era, left
unaddressed in both Tasini and Robertson. The court delineated the
differences between print and digitized works, thereby showing a
more profound understanding of authors' legal predicament in the
digital world. To the Belgian court, authors are only deemed to have
granted publishers those licensing rights to bring their articles to the
newspapers' specific public audience.335 Similarly, on appeal, the
German court reversed the lower court decision since CD-ROM is a
new independent and very different means of exploitation. Of interest
is the German Court's pronouncement that through electronic
reproduction "there is no loss of quality, with obvious negative
consequences to the rights of authors. 336  The Dutch courts also
looked at the digital reproduction of articles as distinct to print to find
against the publishers.337
However, while Plurim~dia also distinguished the print and
electronic media as seen in the Belgian, American, and Canadian
decisions, the case nonetheless had a matter-of-fact approach to
enforcing the authors' rights pursuant to the French Code of
Intellectual Property Law. Put differently, the court did not appear to
struggle with substantive copyright infringement questions but merely
applied the appropriate statute. Further, in Plurim~dia, a number of
journalists and their trade union brought legal action, not against their
newspaper publisher but the online service provider. The court
333. Id. at 41.
334. Jane C. Ginsburg, Electronic Rights in Belgium and France, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 161, 161-63 (1998).
335. Id.
336. Hugenholtz & Kroon, supra note 323, at 7-8.
337. Volkskrant. 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 187.
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asserted that the online service provider should have verified the
validity of the grants. Online reproduction was subject to the
author's, not the newspaper company's, consent; if the newspaper
company never received those rights, the company had no right to
transfer them to a third party.
2. Settlement
In Europe, parties appear more prone to settlement both prior
and post litigation. In De Volkskrant, the evidence indicates the first
time a publisher is forthcoming in working out a compensation
scheme prior to the dispute. But while the publisher was willing to
compensate the plaintiffs for digital reuse of their works, it asked for
a three-year freeze upon making any payment since "the operation of
the electronic media [was] still in an experimental stage." 338 The
Dutch court did not find the publisher's "proposal" completely
reasonable and substantiated its ruling by finding that the defendant
had in principle acknowledged rewarding the freelancers for new
uses. 339 In Central Station, the Belgian publishers settled that they
would no longer electronically distribute freelance articles in the
consortium without the freelancer's consent.3 4 °  Moreover, in
response to the freelancers' moral right of attribution claim, the
publishers committed to "stop the online distribution of the works
without crediting the by-line originally appearing in the publication of
the articles. 34 1 In Plurim;dia, the parties also reached an agreement
after the ruling, and the appeal only dealt with the re-use issue of
televised news items.
C. Comparing North American and ContinentalEuropean Case
Law
1. Progressive Legislation
According to Jane Ginsburg, a comparison of the decisions and
national laws on freelancers to date indicates that European courts are
more author-friendly in contrast to American courts which protect
publishers.34 2 While her article does not detail the reason for this
attitude, from an analysis of the examined case law the answer seems
simple. While European courts may perhaps be pro-author because of
338. Id. at 182.
339. Id. at 187.
340. Central Station, 1998 E.C.C. at 43.
341. Id.
342. Ginsburg, supra note 334, at 164.
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their droit d'auteur tradition, European courts apply clearly drafted
laws. With the exception of the Netherlands, where courts
nonetheless applied the assignment transfer rule to licenses, these
European enactments are, in contrast to the Canadian and American
statutes, better equipped to elucidate the ambiguities plaguing the
conveyance of new uses resulting from the onslaught of digital media.
The Belgian statute endorsed a strict pro-author interpretation when
rights were not clearly delineated.343 The French copyright provision
precisely addressed royalty payments to authors to the extent that new
uses were exploited.344 The German and Dutch acts allowed the
reading of no more rights than necessary to give effect to the
contract's purpose. Pierre-Andr6 Dubois and Colleen Chien,
therefore seem correct in saying that "contract terms cannot be
enlarged to include new uses enabled by advances in technology after
the formation of an agreement, unless specifically contemplated or
bargained for."
345
2. Conciliatory Environment
Against Tasini's dire outcome, some European cases worked out
settlement contracts. For example, in the Belgian case, the parties
settled prior to the ruling.346 This conciliatory aftermath is perhaps
indicative of a publishing culture that is not only author-friendly in its
laws, but also reasonable in its industry's treatment of authors. As
some commentators have argued, this scenario bodes well for the US,
"demonstrating that authors and publishers are capable of reaching
agreement in the management of electronic rights. 347 Albeit
imperfect, settlement contracts are still persuasive ways to foster or, at
least, establish decent relations among publishers and authors.
Furthermore, European advocates appear more attuned to authors'
interests in constructing moral rights violations in their pleadings.
Neither the American or Canadian courts heard such claims, which as
stated could have been sensibly grounded based on the available
evidence. Additionally, the European courts did not entirely concern
themselves in delineating the legal nature of the collective work of the
newspaper as distinct from the individual freelancers' works-the
focus was more on the contractual nature of the new use rights. It is
343. BCA, supra note 331.
344. CPI, supra note 310.
345. Pierre-Andr6 Dubois & Colleen Chien, Tasini: Moving Towards a Global Model for
the Use of Journalists' Works?, COPYRIGHT WORLD 12, 12 (Sept. 2001).
346. Volkskrant, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 181.
347. Dubois & Chien, supra note 345, at 14.
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however also possible that the conciliatory nature of the European
social climate is due to publishers' knowledge of these laws and their
perceived risk of contesting freelancers' claims in court.348
3. Drawbacks: Foreseeable Fixation
It is nonetheless disconcerting that judicial reasoning in most of
the examined jurisdictions features a fixation on the foreseeability of
,the new medium of exploitation. Although a fiction, courts have
adopted a foreseeability factor as an interpretive tool. Courts decide
based on either when the medium was developed or when the
technology became commercially available in order to interpret
ambiguous new use clauses in contracts. In some respects, even the
Canadian court that did not mention the foreseeability principle,
alluded to the issue, in discussing the inception of InfoGlobeOnline's
practice and freelancers' imputed knowledge of this new custom.
Scholars like Sidney Rosenzweig argue that absent clear intent or a
finding of unconscionability in a contract, courts should examine the
foreseeability of the new medium.349  The logic is that if the
technology was unforeseeable, the grantor retains rights, whereas if
the technology was invented, though not commercialized, the rights
are granted to the grantee along with those of the pre-existing
medium.350
Rosenzweig's work is invaluable in that he is one of the few
scholars to address the issue of new uses, albeit from an American
perspective. From a utilitarian standpoint and relying on Bartsch's
reasoning,35' he contends that because the publisher is in the better
position to exploit new media with smaller transaction costs, vague
contracts should always be interpreted to favor the publisher.352 He
defines a new use as "an accretion or unearned increment" that is a
"windfall" that occurs after the production of a work.353 And since
the new use was beyond the intentions of the parties, "the author, as a
348. The lack of empirical evidence and scholarship makes such motivating factors
speculative. The publishers' motivation could perhaps be ascertained with some fieldwork,
which is at this stage beyond the bounds of time and space.
349. See generally Rosenzweig, supra note 7.
350. To some extent, the German court conceded that the new medium must not only be
invented but commercialized for this foreseeability factor to apply, consequently making it
somewhat more author-friendly than Rosenzweig's proposition. Id. at 915.
351. Bartsch v. MGM, 391 F.2d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied 393 U.S. 826
(1968).
352. Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 922-23.
353. Id. at 925.
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result, could not have expected to profit from such future medium. 354
The one-time windfall from a new use is therefore used to subsidize
the licensee or publisher in his effort to develop the new medium.355
Rosenzweig further suggests that it is most opportune for publishers
to retain electronic rights when the technology is not yet invented, and
authors have even less expectations and are less likely to have
diminished incentives to create.356
Rosenzweig's work does not however show a clear
understanding of fundamental principles of property, contract or trust
law, let alone the freelancer's predicament or the user communities he
purports to benefit. First, why should the authors' works subsidize
publishers, when these media conglomerates are in a business with
the expectation of making and losing money?357 Authors, especially
freelancers, are professionals who attempt to earn a living. Second, it
is unreasonable to assume that just because the technology was
unforeseeable, that authors did not expect additional compensation, or
more importantly, expected to lose control over the exploitation and
management of their works in new media. Rosenzweig's argument
gives authors very little credit for their dealings with publishers and
emerging media. Although many freelancers may in fact be
unsophisticated, they should not be penalized for their inability to
bargain express use rights in their contracts. Third, why cannot
publishers reward authors for future uses of their works by some form
of royalty scheme? The French media industry rewards authors
through a royalty scheme. In this fashion, publishers could still use
authors' works for due consideration. Fourth, just as authors could
not have expected to profit from the future use, the same case applies
to publishers. Clearly the choice of which party benefits from the
"windfall" is based on Rosenzweig's bias. Should authors not be in a
better position to reap from the work especially given their socially
imbalanced position? Lastly, the publisher is in a better position to
exploit works from a social efficiency perspective fails to consider
whether this is appropriate for the public interest.358 For instance,
having more power in the hands of a few media does not result in a
greater variety of works or greater access to these works. Since there
will likely always be new emerging modes of exploitation that will by
354. Id. at 925.
355. Id. at 926.
356. Id. at 925.
357. Grosheide characterizes this as an "economic flow back." Grosheide, supra note 10,
at 323.
358. On the other hand, this may be the strongest argument in favor of publishers and
befitting the economic justification (still no reason for publishers not to pay rent for their uses).
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definition be foreseeable, freelancers will continue to be the
disadvantaged party. Rather than blindly applying presumptive
principles that would effectively favor publishers, other solutions
mindful of the ongoing imbalanced freelancer-publisher relationship
are necessary.
VII. LAW OF FREELANCE WORK IN BRITAIN: PRE-EMPTING A
DIGITAL DILEMMA
Britain has yet to see litigation on the issue of whether
freelancers' contracts, which allowed publishers to print their works,
contemplated electronic publishing rights.35 9 I therefore examine
jurisprudence in other copyright sectors, such as the film industry,
relating to conveyancing of copyright generally in order to provide
some insight into the interpretation of new uses.
A. Overview
While the continental European jurisdictions featured specific
national laws for interpreting freelance contracts, the same cannot be
said for Britain. Similar in scope to assignments,3 60 the Copyright,
Designs and Patent Act (CDPA) mandates that exclusive licenses be
in writing.361 Distinct from Germany, future copyright can be
assigned in Britain, which may vest in the assignee once the future
work comes into existence.36 2 Also, moral rights can be waived in
writing but cannot be assigned.363 Yet, besides these provisions,
British freelancers and publishers must rely on industry custom. As
elsewhere in North America and Europe, due to the informal nature of
contracting between the parties, these legal relationships are regarded
by custom as implied non-exclusive licenses to publish the work.
While the CDPA provides for infringement claims, it unlikely
provides freelancers with any other claims, such as the right of
364 365
attribution,3 64 and the right against derogatory treatment, as seen in
359. Updated as at July 16, 2002.
360. The distinction between licenses and assignments "is not always so clear-cut;" an
exclusive license of all rights to run until the rights expire is in practical reasons like an
assignment. And so, "it is not so much what the contract is called but the effect of the
transaction which decides whether there is an assignment or a license." See PEARSON & MILLER,
supra note 78.
361. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, ch. 48 § 92(1).
362. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act ,ch. 48 § 92.
363. Copyright, Designs & Patent Act, ch. 48 §§ 94-95.
364. Chapter 48 § 77 of the CDPA is likely not applicable given the exceptions § 79(2)(c)
(computer generated works), § 79(5)(current events reporting) and § 79(6)(a) (publications in
newspapers, magazines or similar periodicals).
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other European jurisdictions. In this sense, British copyright may be
more aligned to the common law North American system, which in
contrast to the continental European droit d'auteur tradition does not
feature the exclusive protection of authors' rights.366
B. General New Use Jurisprudence in Britain
While one must be careful to analogize freelancers in the
publishing industry to those in other sectors where written contracts
are often in place and industry customs are different, the same
fundamental issue remains: whether a copyright license embraces
newer forms of technological exploitation. In relation to judicial
interpretive techniques of new use clauses in these industries,
although Rosenzweig argues that modem American courts ultimately
will adopt the foreseeability test, Tim Naprawa contends that British
courts likely will examine: (1) the intent of the parties, (2) the
unfairness or unconscionability in bargaining terms, and (3) the
foreseeability of the new media at the time of contract formation. 367
While these factors certainly figure into decision-making, and to some
extent the latter prevails, a fourth factor, the purpose-of-grant rule as
codified in the German Copyright Act, also plays a role. As such, in
order to speculate on the potential judicial treatment of freelancers'
new use rights in Britain, it is useful to analyze the variety of
available interpretive tools.
1. Film Industry: Intent, Foreseeability, and Fairness
Throughout the Commonwealth and the US, grantees in the film
industry have prevailed in gaining control of new uses.368 In a leading
British case, Hospital for Sick Children v. Walt Disney Productions369
concerning an implied license, Justice Salmon, per curiam, for the
Court of Appeal, extended the meaning of "cinematograph or moving
picture films" in the use clause to include "sound films." At the time
of the contract in 1919, between the author of the play "Peter Pan"
365. See Copyright, Designs & Patent Act ch. 48 §§ 81 (2)(3)(4) (for similar exceptions).
366. The common law tradition admits protection of both individuals and corporate bodies
and thus protects a wide variety of creative endeavors. See generally DAVIES, supra note 93.
367. Tim Naprawa, Secondary Use of Articles in Online Databases Under UK Law, 9
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 331, 356 (1996). This is the only study found examining British case law on
new uses. Naprawa adopts Rosenzweig's analysis of American judicial interpretive methods.
368. See DAVID. VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 229 (2000); see L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film
Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936).
369. Hosp. for Sick Children (Bd. of Governors) v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., [1968] 1 Ch
20021
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and a film company, only silent films were on the market.370  Ten
years later, the author bequeathed his copyright in the play to the
plaintiff hospital. The dispute arose in 1964, when the plaintiff
hospital negotiated with a third party to make a motion picture of the
play. Walt Disney, a licensee of Peter Pan pursuant to a 1919
contract by assignment, objected and the hospital lost the contract and
sued for damages. Walt Disney argued that its use clause for silent
films also warranted the right to make sound films.371 Justice Salmon
examined the terms of the 1919 contract as well as subsequent party
dealings. Since there was no British case law on point, Justice
Salmon applied two foreign rulings favoring grantees 372 and opined
that the grant "carried with it all ancillary rights of development.,
373
"[T]he test is not what was within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the agreement," but what was within the "wide and
embracing words" used in light of changing circumstances. 374 Yet,
while Justice Salmon would have granted the hospital the right to
make the sound film, Lord Denning, arguing for the majority, refused
and restricted the grant exclusively to silent films since sound films
were not foreseeable at the time of contracting.
In the digital era, besides the first judicial requirement to intuit
the parties' intent,375 the case of Hospital for Sick Children may
primarily support adopting a foreseeability test since the court was
concerned with the timing of the contract and the inception of the new
media. The foreseeability test yielded two distinct results based on its
differential reading of the use clause in light of the industry's
technological developments. As noted earlier, the foreseeability test
presents numerous drawbacks to freelancers and is unlikely to yield a
positive ruling. Since the plaintiff hospital lost its right to re-use the
play because of the film company, to what extent did court sympathy
play a factor in deciding the local plaintiff hospital's battle against the
more "entrepreneurial" media conglomerate, Walt Disney? Or, to
what degree did the court see Walt Disney's conduct as unfair?
370. In 1927 talking pictures were introduced to the public upon the invention of the
thermionic valve in 1923.
371. Hospitalfor Sick Children, [1968] 1 Ch 52 at 63.
372. See Fox Film, 83 F.2d at 196; Williamson Ltd. v. MGM Theatres Ltd., [1937] 56
C.L.R. 567.
373. Hospital for Sick Children, [1968] Ch 52 at 59.
374. Id. at 60.
375. Courts customarily first assess the intent of the parties when resolving contractual
ambiguities. Michael Fuller, Hollywood goes Interactive: Licensing Problems Associated with
Re-Purposing Motion Pictures into Interactive Multimedia Videogames, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J.
599, 604 (1995).
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Although the court does not elaborate, in Hospital for Sick Children,
the foreseeability factor and to some extent the parties' intent and
fairness appeared to have played a role in the judicial ruling in favor
of the plaintiff hospital. The case also shows that in the absence of
case law, British courts will readily look beyond their jurisdictions to
apply foreign rulings.
2. Unconscionability in Bargaining?
British courts have held contracts invalid where there is a
disparity of obligation between the parties or unfairness in
bargaining.376 Based on these holdings, Walt Disney's conduct may
have been unconscionable. By applying developments in the English
film and music decisions,377 some commentators posit that authors
could succeed by relying on the "revitalised [sic] doctrine of
unconscionable bargains," provided that their vulnerability manifest
disadvantage in the particular agreement, and specific instance of
advantage-taking can be characterized as "exceptional, patent and
egregious." 378 While in these past rulings plaintiffs challenged
copyright assignment clauses, the issue remains the same in
freelancers' cases, namely, unfairness in bargaining. As Lord
Denning stated in Clifford, in which the new publisher sought to
produce a new album that would have infringed the plaintiff
composer's copyrights, "there was such inequality of bargaining
power that the agreement should not be enforced... ,,379 The former
publisher was expected to have the plaintiff composer seek
independent legal advice.380  Applying the doctrine of equity may,
however, challenge Lord Hoffman's principles of "practical
considerations of business., 38' Essentially, the concept that equity
will restrain the enforcement of legal rights provides courts with an
undefined discretion to refuse contractual enforcement. Besides
breeding uncertainty, equity's mere existence enables litigation to be
used as a negotiating tactic.382 While in the case of freelancers
376. Naprawa, supra note 367, at 349; Schroeder v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616
(holding a contract between a music publisher and composer invalid because of their unequal
bargaining position).
377. Clifford Davis Mgnt Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., [1975] 1 All E.R. 237, 238.
378. Roger Brownsword, Copyright Assignment, Fair Dealing, And Unconscionable
Contracts, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 311 (1998). The same considerations would apply if the
challenge is based on a recognized relieving doctrine like undue influence.
379. Clifford Davis Management, I All E.R. at 241.
380. Id.
381. Union Eagle, Ltd. v. Golden Achievement Ltd., [1997] 2 All E.R. 215, 218-19.
382. Id.
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applying equity principles is highly premature in resolving
disputes,383  it is nonetheless useful to recognize possible
developments in other copyright sectors that may have some future
applicability.
3. Software Industry: Intent and Purpose
In contrast to the film industry's rulings favoring grantees, more
recently, the British software industry's interpretation of new uses in
implied licenses has arguably yielded a more balanced result. In
Saphena Computing v. Allied Collection Agencies,384 the Court of
Appeal affirmed a High Court ruling and limited an implied license to
the use of the computer program's source code 385 for "repair purposes
only" and not for further exploitation. The plaintiff, Saphena, was a
software supplier and had licensed a software program to the
defendant client. The issue was whether the source code was implied
in the use of the license. For our purposes, the High Court judgment
is more instructive in revealing the facts concerning the implied
license. The High Court ruled that had the parties intended to include
the use of the source code in the contract they would have done so
expressly.386  However, the High Court found that because the
software was not entirely "fit for its purpose", and it could not have
reasonably been the parties' intention that bugs remained in the
program, it was implicit that the defendant should have used the
source code only for "the limited purpose of repairing such bugs. 38 7
Notably, in obiter, the High Court stated that if the defendant had
gone further with the use of the source code, such as sub-licensing it
to third parties, it would be infringing the plaintiffs copyright. The
purpose of the defendant client's business of a debt-collecting agency
"do[es] not include lending or selling or hiring programs to any third
party... except upon the.. .permission of the [supplier]. 388 Lastly,
the High Court found it important that if the opportunity arose, the
plaintiff supplier could have licensed the software to other
389
customers.
383. "English law has no general doctrine of good faith in contracts generally, instead, 'it
has developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness."
Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] Q.B. 433.
384. Saphena Computing Ltd. v. Allied Collection Agencies, Inc., [1995] F.S.R. 616.
385. The source code is distinguishable from the object code. Id. at 636.
386. Rather, only the provision for the object code had been agreed upon, "because that
was sufficient to fulfill the functions required." Id. at 637.
387. Id. at 637.
388. Id. at 638. The court did not decide whether the permission should be in writing.
389. Id. at 634.
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In addition to analyzing the parties' intent during the agreement
negotiation, the court stressed the importance of the purpose of the
grant. While the case is distinguishable on the facts, 390 the High
Court's use of the purpose test may still be applied as a neutral tool to
interpret ambiguous freelance licenses. Arguably, as newspaper
companies are in the business of selling newspapers, the freelancer's
implied license is to be limited to print copies, excluding electronic
distribution to third parties. Conversely, newspaper companies could
also sell newspapers through their own Web sites, or through third
party databases. The result will turn on defining the business purpose
of the newspaper company. Lastly, the purpose-of-grant rule, while
ultimately a matter of interpretation could likely be advantageous to
freelancers if used in light of Saphena's narrow approach. This
approach limited the purpose of freelancers' implied grants to mere
print rights for publishers and placed the onus on grantees to contract
for unexpressed rights.
4. Music Industry: General Contract Interpretation
Principles and Purpose
As technology progresses, the music industry must also address
the difficult issue of how to interpret new use rights. In Robin Ray v.
Classic FM,391 the English High Court used general contract
principles of construction in analyzing an implied term in a consulting
agreement between a contractor and his client, the British radio
station Classic FM. The radio station had hired the contractor to
assemble a play-list of songs compiled in a database. The dispute
arose when the radio station made copies of the database and licensed
those copies to foreign radio stations. However, the radio station's
entitlement to make copies and use the database for the purpose of
broadcasting from its radio station in Britain were not at issue, as the
terms had been set out in a contract recital. Similar to Saphena, the
English High Court examined the purpose of the written contract and
ruled that the defendant had the right to use the play-list for the
"indefinite future for this purpose and for this purpose only"-that is,
broadcasting in Britain.392
The Ray court stated that the grantee has the burden of proving
its copyright entitlement and found the grantor retained copyright in
390. Freelancers seldom have an ongoing relationship to 'maintain' or 'update' their
articles, as does a software supplier. Freelance work ends upon submission. Still, this difference
could likely work to freelancers' advantage since such 'repair' terms could not be ascribed.
391. Robin Ray v. Classic FM, Plc., [1998] F.S.R 622.
392. Id. at 510.
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default of an express term.393 For a term to be implied, it must be,
intra alia: (1) reasonable and equitable, (2) necessary to give business
efficacy to the contract, such that it is not necessary to imply a term if
the contract is effective without it, and (3) so obvious "it goes without
saying. 39 4  More importantly, the implication of terms is "so
potentially intrusive that the law imposes strict constraints on the
exercise of this extraordinary power.,
395
Ray could arguably be used to again limit the scope of the
implied license in the freelancer's favor. First, as in Saphena, the
court adopted a minimalist approach. Second, just as the English
Court found it unpalatable for the purpose of the license to allow the
radio station to license its database copies to third parties, it may be
equally inappropriate to license articles to third party databases which
can be accessed across the globe. Like the plaintiff contractor who
did not intend his work to be exploited beyond the radio station's
broadcasting range, similarly, freelancers do not intend their articles
to be distributed beyond the reach of their print publications. Indeed,
while the multi-media conglomerate could arguably have indefinite
rights to articles, it could not exploit them outside the scope of the
implied established territory. Publishing on the Internet would
therefore violate this territorial restriction. Still, that the concept of
applicable territory, however vague, was codified in a recital is an
enviable difference with respect to freelancers' verbal agreements that
typically do not contemplate geographical area of use. Above all,
given the court's non-interventionist approach, Ray, along with
Saphena, may support a favorable reading of implied licenses,
especially in light of freelancers' often uncodified terms.
5. Conclusions
As a brief overview of the British case law has shown, judges
adopt a variety of factors in analyzing written implied licenses. Court
decisions featured such factors like foreseeability, purpose-of-grant,
contract construction principles, and to some extent the parties' intent
and fairness in the bargaining. British courts have not made clear
which, if any factors, should be emphasized. While finding intent of
the parties will always be an attractive test, the test is unhelpful since
intent will seldom be found.396 As a result courts will be left to draw
on other determinants.
393. Id. at 507.
394. Id. at 507.
395. Id. at 507.
396. M. Fuller, supra note 375, at 608.
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While interpretive factors varied, one approach that British
courts appeared to favor (other than in the film industry), was a
minimalist one. This restrictive approach advantaged the plaintiff
challenging the defendant's expansive use of the license or
alternatively yielded a balanced result for both parties. This balance
was achieved through the court's construction of the use grant to the
extent necessary to give efficacy to the business transaction. In
Saphena, the court granted sufficient use of the source code, or
enough that would be "fit for its purpose" and in Ray, the court
granted sufficient scope to exploit the play-list in Britain.
Consequently, neither party lost or won more than they had initially
bargained for in the agreement. In Saphena, the court highlighted that
if a licensing opportunity presented itself the licensor should supply
the software to third parties, and not the licensee company.
Contrary to what some commentators believe397 British law does
not specifically deal with new use rights as practiced by its European
counterparts. Therefore, British courts may need to consider: (1)
general "new use" British cases, like Hospital for Sick Children,
Saphena and Ray, and/or (2) foreign precedents on freelancers'
electronic rights in North America and continental Europe. These
various options which British courts may adopt, create difficulty in
predicting the outcome of a potential freelancer dispute. Should
British courts follow film industry rulings, then perhaps publishers
will prevail. Still, the oral nature of freelancer agreements places a
substantial limitation on interpreting the vast majority of such
agreements. It is indeed difficult to look at contract construction
principles when terms are unwritten.
In summary, a British court could consider any of the following:
Factors
* Intent of the parties (initial factor in all cases)
* Industry custom (Robertson)
* Purpose of grant (Freelens and De Volkskrant albeit
codified in statute, Saphena, Ray)
* Foreseeability (Robertson, Plurim&dia, De Volkskrant,
Freelens lower court)
* Unfairness in bargaining (Hospital for Sick Children)
* Contract Interpretation principles: absent express term,
default rule favors grantor (Ray)
* General nature of electronic distribution of articles (Tasini,
Robertson, Central Station)
397. Naprawa, supra note 367, at 331.
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Approaches
* Purposive reading of statute in context of historically
disadvantaged freelancers (Tasini majority)
* Expansive approach (Hospital for Sick Children, per
curiam, foreign commonwealth film industry decisions)
* Minimalist approach to statute and contract interpretation,
absent expressly enumerated rights (Tasini on USCA §
201 (c) and Robertson on CCA section 13(4), Hospital for
Sick Children, Saphena, Ray)
* Onus on grantee (Saphena, Ray) on grantor (Robertson,
Tasini dissent, Bartsch, Nimmer)
Besides this range of factors and approaches, freelancers will be at the
behest of the judiciary, making the outcome of cases even harder to
predict. Moreover, freelancers may face the danger that upon
favorable rulings, publishers may retaliate and expunge freelance
articles from digital circulation or force freelancers into unfair
398settlement agreements. Alternative laws are therefore necessary
which consider freelancers' historically and presently imbalanced
condition vis-A-vis their publishers.
VIII. SEARCHING FOR FREELANCER-FRIENDLY SOLUTIONS
No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.
-Samuel Johnson
399
A. Judicial Interpretation of Freelance Contracts
As we consider solutions for Britain and other jurisdictions
across the western world, namely North America, leaving freelancers
to litigate their rights is not the preferred approach-time and cost are
a few of the main deterrents. It is nonetheless important that since
courts will likely continue to adjudicate freelancers' cases, courts
should adopt clear principles, especially in light of the indeterminate
methods of interpretation gleaned from the canvassed case law.
In contrast to the absence of British scholarly works and the
398. See generally Tasini, 184 F. Supp. 2d 350.
399. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 355 (Emily Morison Beck et al. eds.,
1980).
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noted commentary on freelancer cases, US scholarship provides a
more fertile body of literature on new use rights. Michael Fuller and,
more recently, Stacey Byrnes has examined this issue. While Fuller
concludes that the court lacks any methodology from his outline of a
variety of factors adopted by American courts,4 °0 Stacey Byrnes
proposes an analytic founded on copyright policy and theory and
challenges Melville Nimmer's default rules favoring either licensor or
licensee.40' In brief, Nimmer posits that absent ascertainable intent, a
court will construe a license to either: (1) restrict any rights not
expressly set out, thereby favoring the licensor or author, or (2) re-
purpose the work in any medium that the language of the license
could reasonably permit, thereby favoring the licensee.40 2
Based on her analytic theory, Bymes suggests that Nimmer's
categories contravene copyright policy considerations meant to
inform interpreting ambiguous copyright licenses.40 3 Byrnes reasons
that because of the transformative nature of derivative works publicly
disseminated,4° society is enriched by the work, thereby fulfilling one
of the primary US copyright objectives, namely, "to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good. ' 405 She argues that because
many "truly transformative works" may eclipse the original work's
value to the public, to adopt a pro-licensor rule would discourage any
further improvement or creativity by the licensee. 406 On the other
hand, adopting a pro-licensee rule would "automatically subordinate
the interests of the author of the underlying work to those of the
derivative work."40 7 Rather than endorsing Nimmer's default rules,
Byrnes offers that policy should infuse the judicial analysis,
beginning with the framing of the contract to the framing of the
question in court.40 8 For instance, one of the questions that parties
may ask themselves when drafting a contract, or likewise a court may
later ask when interpreting ambiguous contracts, is whether the
parties intended to restrict the dissemination of works.40 9
400. Foreseeability, fairness, contractual language including future advance and
reservation of rights clauses are some factors. Fuller, supra note 375, at 604, 623.
401. Stacey Byrnes, Legal and Business Issues in the Digital Distribution of Music, 20
Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 243, 251 (2000).
402. Id. at 257.
403. Id. at 271.
404. For instance, films are often based on pre-existing copyright material, such as novels.
405. Byrnes, supra note 401, at 264.
406. Id. at 270.
407. Id. at 273-74.
408. Id. at 279.
409. Id. at 279.
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While Byrnes' approach to consult copyright policy is a sensible
and flexible way to tackle issues of ambiguity relating to conveyances
of new uses, and one which is often silenced in most decisions, we are
left with few concrete solutions. First, it is unrealistic to assume that
parties will be sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate policy
considerations in drafting contracts, especially when the freelance
industry often uses verbal contracts. Second, adopting Byrnes' policy
infused approach, while on its face neutral or "pro-public," would be
essentially undermining creators' rights. Freelancers' historically
imbalanced position cannot be so easily dismissed. Third, assuming
Byrnes' policy considerations will permeate at the contracting stage,
and later in decision-making, whether the most appropriate ruling will
ensue is questionable. Absent clear contracts or clear laws, judicial
tinkering will vary across jurisdictions due to many other factors at
play.
More fundamentally, the ambiguity of freelancers' rights in the
digital era creates difficulty in analogizing their state to Byrnes'
licensors. Byrnes bases her assumption on the notion that the licensee
adds some value to the transformed work. In the freelancer's case, it
is not apparent how the newspaper company's digital reproduction of
articles online or, through third party Web sites, adds value to these
underlying articles. Indeed, the converse may be true. By
disseminating freelance works in often ideologically incompatible
media, licensee publishers may cause authors to be tainted,
consequently making them less credible. Nonetheless, conceding that
the licensee publishers add some value to the benefit of society, what
about the authors? Should they not eat or drink? Should copyright
law not also work for them? 410 Also, freelancers cannot be assumed
to be on an equal contracting scale as publishing conglomerates, no
more than a nameless novelist is with a Hollywood movie tycoon. In
the end, we again face the conundrum of weighing copyright policy in
the construction of new use licenses: whose interests should copyright
policy address? How can it achieve a balance?
1. Pro-Freelancer Default Rule
Given the often imprecise nature of bargaining between
freelancers and publishers, and the general lack of express legislation,
particularly in North America and Britain, courts should apply a
default rule favoring freelancers. Many cases support this approach.
In Ray, the court acknowledged that absent express terms, a default
410. David Vaver, Agnostic Observations on Intellectual Property Law, 6 INTELL.
PROP. J. 125, 129 (1991).
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rule should favor the grantor. Tasini's purposive holding on the
"publisher's privilege" in USCA § 201(c) would arguably support
such an approach.41' Commentators also state that when in doubt,
courts should construe rights narrowly.4 12 In this way, the purpose of
the grant would also be taken into account in a restrictive fashion.
Moreover, as one influential economic law theory suggests, defaults
can usefully function to press a party with better knowledge, typically
the publisher, to be explicit in contract formation,4 3 especially when
contracting with the right to use new technology. Both directly and
indirectly, the pro-freelancer default rule could therefore eventually
account for the unfairness in the bargaining process underpinning the
freelancer-publisher relationship and exacerbated in the digital era.
2. Presumptive License Rule
As gleaned in Robertson, courts do not read the grant in question
as an assignment, for such would constitute a proprietary interest and
contravene copyright policy principles. As an alternative to the pro-
freelancer default rule, courts should presume the existence of a
license on the basis of public interest. And while courts may not find
such assignments to be illegal, they should be deemed unenforceable.
In this way, the actual grant is constructed in a narrow fashion to
protect the interests of the grantor. However, this practice may lead
to unimagined consequences since publishers may begin to insert
waiver clauses in their contracts, thereby pre-empting the
presumption against assignments, in order to avoid such an adverse
finding. A court may then be faced with examining grounds of
unconscionability and inequality in bargaining, which it probably may
not find so as not to interfere with private ordering and commercial
practices.
3. Unconscionability Principles
As one assesses ways in which the judiciary may approach this
414issue,*  the doctrine of unjust enrichment potentially could be used as
a pro-freelancer theory.415  Although this theory will not be fully
411. See generally Gordon, supra note 17.
412. See May, supra note 267, at 25.
413. Irene Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989). Indeed natural law theorists would likely
also support such an approach.
414. Steven Hedley, Unjust Enrichment-A Middle Course?, 4 OXFORD UNIV.
COMMONWEALTH L. J. (forthcoming January 2003) (observing the expansive application of
the unjust enrichment doctrine to extend to various grounds of liability).
415. While there is no case law or literature on point, since 2000 there has been a flurry of
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extrapolated here, Justice Jacob noted that "the principle of unjust
enrichment is capable of elaboration and refinement."''4 6 The theory
could be relevant from the framing of the contract to the framing of
the question in court. To find unjust enrichment, all three elements
must be present: (1) there must be a benefit conferred to the
defendant, (2) at the plaintiffs expense, and (3) it must be unjust to
allow the defendant to retain that benefit. 417 Goff and Jones detail the
various branches of the doctrine.418 Particularly on the benefit
element, they argue that one must have attained an objective benefit
in the sense of a realizable gain or a saved expense.41 9 All three
elements could be present in the freelancer's case. First, the
defendant publishers received the benefit of additional profit, not only
from the articles' print sales but indirectly by Web site advertising
and more importantly through third party databases and CD-ROMs.
Second, the benefit is at the plaintiff freelancers' expense since they
could have licensed these works themselves or through a collective
society and charged a fee. And third, based on the past and present
imbalanced freelancer-publisher relationship, it is unjust that the
defendant publishers retain this profit. The plaintiff freelancers had
"no intention of making a gift '420 to the benefit of defendant
publishers.
In a recent British software industry case of Vedatech v. Crystal
421Decisions, Justice Jacob applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment
to find for the plaintiff software company consultant. In that case, the
consultant software company undertook work for the benefit of an
English software company attempting to penetrate the Japanese
market. The consultant company provided the use of its employees,
and its translation and banking services, but they did not agree to any
specific terms. Distinguishable from the case and the facts of William
v. Lacey is that compensation was afforded for extra time and
materials spent and participation in success of the product.422 In the
freelancers' cases, to argue that freelancers spent additional time and
materials on exploiting the new technologies may be untenable. On
commentary on restitution, the remedy of unjust enrichment. Id.
416. Vedatech v. Crystal Decisions (UK) Ltd., [2002] E.W.H.C. 818 (Ch.).
417. ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 16 (5th ed., Sweet &
Maxwell London 1998).
418. Id. at 21.
419. Id. at 21.
420. Banque Financiere v. Parc, [1999] 1 A.C. 221, 237.
421. See Vedatech, [2002] E.W.H.C .818.
422. Vedatech, [2002] E.W.H.C. 818, at para. 71(citing William v. Lacey, [1957] 1 W.L.R.
932).
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the other hand, as Justice Jacob maintains the "principle of unjust
enrichment is in large part founded on conscience. 423  In the
freelancers' cases, can the publishers, as the receivers of a benefit,
"hang on to it without paying?" Furthermore, with an unjust
enrichment claim there is no issue of whether there was a contract or
whether the plaintiff freelancers relied on the prospects of further
profit from their works. Consequently, while each jurisdiction has its
own approach to interpreting the doctrine 424 and while there is strong
opposition to any broad extension of this doctrine, 425 a court may
favor adopting the doctrine of unjust enrichment. At the very least,
such a doctrine could provide a unifying principle to the disparate
determinants currently at play in freelancer jurisprudence.
4. Ill-advised Contract Interpretation Methods
(a.) Industry Custom
Besides favorable proposals, revisiting methods and approaches
put forth in the case law is useful in highlighting factors that should
not be adopted. We have already discussed the drawbacks of the
foreseeability factor. Other determinants, like industry custom, are
equally problematic in advancing a solution for freelancers because
relying on industry custom has not served freelancers well. Since the
publisher's retention of an implied non-exclusive license for a one-
time print right is the industry practice, scholars argue that with time,
"assuming a new custom develops, the courts may be more inclined to
imply a wider license to permit reproduction in other formats.
' 426
Waiting for a new custom in industry to develop is not the best means
to solve freelancers' issues. As Gordon has suggested, the publishers'
agenda is unilaterally imposed on the freelancers.427 In Robertson,
industry custom worked to the freelancers' disadvantage as the
plaintiff should have known that the electronic distribution custom
existed and was supposed to have restricted her rights accordingly.
Also, partly because in Robertson the court placed excessive weight
on custom, the court found contradictory evidence that resulted in an
inconclusive finding. Furthermore, in light of the recent freelancer
disputes, publishers are unlikely to develop a custom that is either
423. Vedatech, [2002] E.W.H.C. 818, at para. 74.
424. GOFF & JONES, supra note 417, at 16.
425. See Hedley, supra note 414.
426. Simon Gallant & Mary Russell, Publish and Be Damned?, 92(7) L. SOCIETY GAZ. 20
(1995).
427. Gordon, supra note 17, at 495.
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freelancer-friendly or promotes the freelancers' interest. Therefore, to
wait for publishers to mobilize change in this area, and for the courts
to simply endorse this practice, makes for undemocratic and biased
reform.
(b.) Policy
While adopting policy considerations is necessary, appropriate
ones should guide such an approach. For instance, a utilitarian policy
as per the Tasini dissent, erroneously assumes that it would be best to
leave electronic distribution to publishers. Again, an examination of
copyright policy and theory would be invaluable. Suffice it to say, as
some commentators indicated, alternatives like authors' collective
societies are available.
B. Industry Mechanisms
1. Collective Societies
Collective societies can control the electronic distribution of
freelancers' articles and maintain efficient licensing schemes to
distribute the articles to the public. As May observes, "[c]ommercial
copyright transactions require negotiation, monitoring, and
enforcement that can be prohibitively costly for individuals" butfeasible for such an organization. 428 These collective societies may
devise general rules that duplicate contracting terms between two
parties at substantially lower transaction costs. Recently, in the US,
the National Writer's Union spear-headed the Publication Rights
Clearinghouse (PRC) to license and enforce the copyrights of
freelance writers.4 29 In this scheme, writers assign to their agents the
limited right to act on their behalf in licensing the non-exclusive
secondary right for publishers to use their works for a fee. Also, the
PRC is responsible for collecting fees from secondary users and
distributing them to authors. The PRC gives 75% to 90% of the total
collected fees to the member authors. 430  Thus, this organization
works to the authors' advantage by permitting them to retain the right
to grant further exploitation of their works, enabling public access to
their works, and being paid without relying on publishers.
428. See May, supra note 267.
429. Id. at 27.
430. Id.
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2. Contracting, Settlement, and Authors' Rights Groups
As seen in the case law, a large part of the freelancer problem
was due to the ambiguity imbued in freelancers' verbal agreements.
At a minimum, publishers should be required to inform their
contributors of their intentions in advance and maintain some record
of these discussions.43' As Gallant and Russell suggest, publishers
wishing to exploit works in new media should re-obtain licenses for
each new use, or in the case of older printed works, make best efforts
to notify, obtain consent, and pay the author if necessary.43 2
Presumably, not all authors may be compensated depending on the
type of medium used.433 Contracts should also aim to be specific and
avoid all-rights clauses, such as "by all means whether known or
unknown" to cover future technologies.434  As some commentators
state, each transferred right should at least be enumerated.435
Also, since standardized contracts may undermine the individual
needs of some writers,436 freelancers should become more aware of
their legal rights by carefully reading specific contractual clauses and
negotiating tactics (or lack thereof) that publishers may use. While
helpful, freelancers should also be wary of enlisting agents to assist in
bargaining on their behalf. Many authors' rights groups advocate that
contracts should be drafted outlining clearly the terms of the
freelancer-agent arrangement. Information is becoming more readily
available for freelancers. For example, "Contracts Watch" is a free
electronic newsletter from the Contracts Committee of the American
Society of Journalists and Authors (ASJA) which serves as a contract
information center for freelance writers, keeping them informed about
the latest terms and negotiations in the publishing industry.4 37
Organizations, such as Britain's National Union of Journalists, also
provide essential information and support during a potential dispute
and settlement.
Compared to Canada, the US, and Britain, in particular, the
European courts have led the way for a better dispute settlement
method. Against litigation, grievance boards could also provide more
431. See Gallant & Russell, supra note 426.
432. Id.
433. It could be argued that a non-profit consortium should not warrant compensation to
authors upon informed consent.
434. COPINGER & SKONE, supra note 87, at 5-21.
435. Santelli, supra note 14, at 277.
436. Dear Writer, WUC Toronto (1998).
437. See generally American Society of Journalists and Authors, at
http://www.asja.org/cw/cwissues.php (last vistited Dec. 19, 2002).
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effective, personalized, and less expensive ways to address
freelancers' rights. Still, drawbacks remain since if the bargaining
practice is flawed ab initio, so too may be the settlement process,
however informal. Thus, unless the publishing industry changes its
mantra that publishing is a "cash cow" and its view that commerce is
valued above culture,438 other mechanisms, such as contracting and
settlement in conjunction with more tailor-made decision-making
become necessary.
C. National and International Legislative Initiatives
In order to meaningfully address the freelancer's plight in the
digital world, legislative initiatives must permeate at the national and
international level. Indeed, it is insufficient to simply grapple with
unifying judicial interpretation principles and speculate on the
applicability of other doctrines of law. As the Tasini dissent
appropriately stated, legislation can determine the "nature and scope"
of the problem and fashion solutions more easily than courts. 4 3 9 This
reconfiguration must be vigilant of policy objectives that firmly focus
on freelancers' historical and contemporary legal predicament. I
propose that legislation codify the pro-freelancer default rule.
Nationally we have already seen many European countries delineate
laws both cognizant of emerging technologies as well as parties'
responsibilities. A royalty provision mandating that freelancers be
compensated in case of future exploitation, as the French provision
provides, is a sound model. These laws should also contemplate third
party involvement.
Internationally, since the freelance author is not at all considered,
efforts are paramount. Once more freelancer-friendly international
mechanisms are in place, national governments may be impelled to
make domestic changes. Additionally, because as some scholars offer
the law is not human-readable, 440 drafting should also be more
commensurate to people's understanding. Indeed many freelancers
have no idea what their rights in copyright are.
Importantly, the continental European cases may have been
freelancer-friendly not so much because the industry practice is one
which is more conciliatory, or because Europe boasts the droit
d'auteur tradition, but because the laws are constructed in such a
predictable way that publishers already know what they stand to lose.
Therefore, it is not entirely the appeasing culture that induces
438. See generally SCHIFFRIN, supra note 9.
439. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520.
440. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
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settlement but more the ways copyright laws are constructed. Concise
laws are therefore necessary to encourage such outcomes. Also, in
common law countries where copyright is meant to facilitate
exploitation and trade, legislators will be hard pressed to enact laws
that interfere with the private ordering of business. Essentially parties
are presumed to be independently sophisticated to bargain for
themselves to arrive at the best solution. While such legislative
initiatives will not likely prevail in the near future, a fertile body of
scholarship needs to develop which posits how copyright laws should
be devised in relation to the socio-economically disadvantaged
freelancer.
D. Final Remarks
The socio-economic and legal state of today's freelancers has not
improved dramatically from that of their seventeenth century
predecessors. Patron-less they still vainly attempt to earn a living
through their works. Today, the vast majority of writers in all genres,
except staff writers, are freelancers.44' From a policy perspective it is
too important a problem to ignore. And given that newer
technologies will continue to be developed and add to the complexity
of contract terms, the issue will not go away. Current copyright
treatment of freelancers in the digital era is vastly inadequate.
I have shown how national and international copyright
mechanisms are insufficient to grapple with these new use problems.
Countries in continental Europe seem to provide clearer and more
favorable laws contemplating ambiguous new uses of copyrighted
works. Yet, when these disputes reach the courts, freelancers are
subject to non-friendly judicial interpretive methods, such as the
foreseeability principle. In order to advance solutions for freelancers
in Britain, and across the western world, I advocate a more freelancer-
friendly approach. At both the national and international levels,
default rules favoring freelancers should be codified and adopted
across the judiciary. Even Tasini's dissent, albeit in passing, was
mindful of the freelancer-publisher imbalance and the need to
compensate authors for their works. Section 201(c) of the US
Copyright Act was re-crafted to address this shortfall. Of course,
judicial and legislative means are only the first step; the cooperation
of industry mechanisms like authors' groups are necessary to
effectively both help shape and later enforce policy on the bargaining
table.
441. DUVERGNE SMITH, supra note 45.
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Ultimately, this Article has explored issues which relate to the
theoretical justifications of copyright law, as seen from the
development of copyright's history to the legislative and judicial
treatment of freelancers in advancing solutions on a policy level and
otherwise. All of these theoretically grounded issues demonstrate the
complexities of copyright law and how the interests of authors and
publishers should be rebalanced. From this preliminary study, we
have learned that the system has been skewed far too long in favor of
publishers. The time has come for the scales to tip the other way.
